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In The Death of Liability' Professor Lynn M. LoPucki argues that
American businesses are rendering themselves judgment proof.- Using the
metaphor of a poker game, Professor LoPucki claims American businesses are
increasingly able to participate in the poker game without putting "'chips in the
pot."' 3 He argues that it has become easier for American companies to play the
game without having chips in the pot because of the ease with which a modern
debtor can grant secured credit,4 because of the growth of the peculiar form
of sale known as asset securitization, because foreign havens for secreting
assets are now available,6 and because firms can use traditional ways of
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1. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liabdurv. 106 YAiE L.J I (1996)
2. The adjective "judgment proof' and the verb "to judgment proof" have different but imprecise
meanings. Many businesses that are in bankruptcy or liquidation can bc--and cominonl, are-characterized
as "judgment proof" even though the management of those companies nccr took an) action that one vould
describe as "judgment proofing." As I use the verb in this Essay (and as I understand Professor LoPucki
to use it), management has judgment proofed its firm only if the managers knov ngly operate with a sum
of free assets and insurance coverage that is less than the present value of the firm's expected liabilities.
Assume that a catastrophic event (whose economic consequence would bankrupt the firm) has a one-in-ten-
thousand probability of occurring in a ten-year penod. Because the probability of its occurrence is so low.
the present value of that liability would be small, even though the liability from that ecent might greatly
exceed the firm's assets and insurance coverage. If the managers maintain a combination of assets and
insurance coverage that exceeds that expected value, they have not judgment proofed their firm
3. LoPucki, supra note I, at 3.
4. See id. at 14-19.
5. See id. at 23-30.
6. See id. at 32-38. It is unclear whether Professor LoPucki considers foreign havens suitable for
corporate judgment proofing. See nfra note 21 and accompan)ing text
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avoiding legal liability-such as scattering their assets among subsidiary
corporations.7
In Part I, I describe Professor LoPucki's thesis, and in Part II, I present an
empirical response to it. Part II is composed principally of data collected from
the Compustat database, which contains financial information on almost all
American public companies. The data on secured debt, asset-to-liability ratio,
and the presence of insurance show that the story Professor LoPucki tells is
fictional. Part III explains why. It offers reasons that firms choose not to
judgment proof themselves and considers various barriers to judgment
proofing. The analysis explains not only why judgment proofing is less
prevalent today than Professor LoPucki suggests, but also why it is unlikely
ever to grow into a serious problem in the United States.
I. LOPUCKI'S THESIS
It is important to understand what in Professor LoPucki's thesis is explicit,
what is implicit, and what is unclear. First, Professor LoPucki does not say
merely that certain persons and firms have found ways to avoid their just
liability by putting their assets beyond the reach of their creditors. A debtor's
divestiture of assets in the face of creditors' claims or operation with too little
capital are well-known and ancient practices. The infamous Twyne's Case8
cast a shadow over modern commercial security law by suggesting that a
debtor commits a fraudulent conveyance when he secretly conveys security to
a creditor while retaining possession of the property. Taking secret security,
making fraudulent conveyances, operating with insufficient capital, and
distributing one's assets to shareholders in preference to creditors have been
practiced for hundreds of years; they are explicitly not the subject of Professor
LoPucki's complaint.
He makes a stronger claim. Through his poker game metaphor, he claims
that "[miajor players are reducing their stakes"9 and that "[s]ome large
businesses now employ [judgment-proofing strategies] and market forces are
driving their competitors to do the same."' Thus, he claims not that a few
businesses are doing the things that businesses and individuals have always
done, and not only that it is now possible with modern devices to do these
things more broadly, but that American businesses are, in fact, judgment
proofing themselves," and that there is a trend for a larger number of all
7. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 20-23.
8. 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601); see also Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer Law as
the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C. L. Rnv. 1165, 1169-75 (1995) (describing the effect of Twynes
Case on the development of fraudulent transfer law).
9. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 3 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 5.
II. Professor LoPucki asserts, "Probably most individuals and businesses are either judgment proof,
or capable of rendering themselves so between commencement of civil action against them and the entry
[Vol. 107: 13631364
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firms to do the same.' 2 His assertion is not merely that devices are available;
it is an empirical assertion that these devices are being used more
systematically than ever before and that their use will become more widespread
in the future.
It is important also to understand who Professor LoPucki believes are the
victims of these transactions. The victims are not conventional unsecured
creditors with contract claims; they are creditors with claims imposed by tort
and statute.13 Professor LoPucki recognizes that contract creditors--creditors
ranging from banks to finance companies to suppliers-can and will bargain
for protection.'4 He is concerned about people who are sometimes referred
to as "involuntary" creditors, 5 creditors whose claims are thrust upon them
as a result of an accident or a violation of a statutory obligation of the debtor.
Common examples include parties injured by auto accidents, asbestos
exposure, and environmental contamination, and any other victim of tort
liability, whether the liability arises from an intrauterine device, a breast
implant, or a cigarette.
Although he does not say so in clear terms, Professor LoPucki should be
less concerned with the run-of-the-mill tort claimant-the person who is
injured in a collision with a truck owned by General Electric-than with
victims of mass torts. Victims of random and conventional negligence are
usually covered by insurance,' 6 and where that is not true, the costs of paying
of judgment." Id. at 4-5 (footnote omitted). If he claims only thai a large share of the individuals in
American society have only trivial ssets available for unsecured creditors, he is surel) correct. but the
point is neither novel nor interesting. The same would have been true of American society from the tune
of the Pilgrims and of most societies from the time of antiqui)
As to businesses being "capable of rendenng themselves ljudgment proof] betvcn the
commencement of a civil action" and the entiy of judgment, there is some question If Professor LoPuckt
means merely that any defendant can give away its assets betvvecn the tune a complaint is filed and served
and the time of judgment, he is surely correct. If he is suggesting that most do so. he is probably wrong
If he is suggesting that those who do dispose of their assets vvithout receiving corresponding value can do
so with impunity, the statement is inaccurate. The paradigmatic fraudulent conv eyance is a transfer to one's
spouse, children, or shareholders after a suit has been filed and in response to a prospective judgment.
12. See id. at 5.
13. See id. at 7.
14. For example, he writes: "Contract habilt) can be preserved through pnvate contracting The
paradigmatic transaction is one in which a closely held corporation seeks a bank loan Banks routmel)
condition such loans on personal guarantees from the owncrs " Id
15. Id. at 45.
16. As Kenneth S. Abraham and Lance Liebman observe. "We rely on both tort lavv and giant
programs of public and private insurance to compensate the victims of . injury .llnsuranee programs
dwarf tort law as a system of reimbursement." Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman. Private Insurance.
Social Insurance. and Tort Reforn: Toward a New tiston of Compensation for llhess and Injur'. 93
COLUM. L. REV. 75. 75-76 (1993). In fact, only 10.5% of compensation for accidents comes from tort
liability; 69% comes from first-party insurance, and an additional 14.9% comes from workers'
compensation. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL.. COMtPENSAnON FOR ACCIDEN-TAL INJIL RIS IN THE U S
108 (1991). The 10.5% from tort liability, moreover, includes payments from defendants' insurers See id
at 175. And as Paul Bargren notes. 95% of consumer tort costs are insured See Paul Bargren. Joint and
Several Liabilit': Protection for Plaintiffs. 1994 Vts. L. REv 453. 476 Of course. these data say nothing
about negligence victims who go entirely uncompensated. but. as Abraham and Liebman note. the vast
majority of Americans are covered by some form of insurance. See Abraham & Liebman. supra. at 80
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their claims are not significant enough to encourage judgment proofing. Even
if a pharmaceutical company were to find it within its interest to judgment
proof itself, it would have plenty of assets with which to answer run-of-the-
mill negligence and products liability claims. LoPucki's real concern is with
mass torts and large-scale statutory liability.
Note, finally, that Professor LoPucki should be concerned principally with
injuries caused by business enterprises, not with torts by individuals. It is a
rare individual who can cause enough personal injury or property damage to
make it worth his while to escape liability. Most of us seriously injure others
only with our automobiles. Most personal automobile liability has been dealt
with by state law that requires insurance or proof of financial responsibility. 7
Among sole proprietors, the only persons who might fit Professor LoPucki's
area of concern are physicians.
In the end, the boundaries of Professor LoPucki's claims are fuzzy. The
grandiose title, which echoes Grant Gilmore's famous attack on contract
doctrine, 8 the assertions about "major players,"' 9 and the disclaimer of any
interest in contract liability lead me to believe that Professor LoPucki is
concerned principally, if not exclusively, with the tort and statutory liability of
public commercial firms. 20 Nevertheless, his discussion of exemptions and
"foreign havens" suggests that he is speaking of individuals, for exemptions
and foreign havens strategies are unavailable for, or not suited to, corporate
judgment proofing.21 In the face of these conflicting indications about the
boundaries of his thesis, I give him the benefit of the doubt by addressing my
17. See ROBERT H. JoosT, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW § 1:8 (2d ed. Supp. 1996)
(observing that 41 states have laws requiring automobile liability insurance); see also 6B JOHN ALAN
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4299 (1979 & Supp. 1996-1997).
18. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (2d ed. 1995).
19. LoPucki, supra note I, at 3.
20. LoPucki's general thesis might also be interpreted to be the claim that both corporate and
individual liability are dying at the hands of judgment-proofing strategies employed by both firms and
individuals. While it may be true that many, or even most, individuals are judgment proof against
substantial liability claims, that is something that has always been true, and has not been of much concern
since liability claims against individuals are generally small and are often covered through insurance (e.g.,
for uninsured motorists) or security (e.g., mortgages). More interesting and controversial, and thus my
primary focus, is Professor LoPucki's claim that corporations are consciously judgment proofing to avoid
paying their tort and statutory liability, see id. at 5, which is much more substantial than that generated by
individuals.
21. Exemptions are one salient example. See I I U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994) (awarding exemptions of the
type discussed in LoPucki, supra note 1, at 10-1I1. to individuals only). As Lawrence Ponoroff and F.
Stephen Knippenberg observe, "[E]xemptions are pivotal to the individual fresh start in bankruptcy."
Lawrence Ponoroff & F Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of
Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235, 240 (1995). For state law
exemptions, see, for example, FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a); MICH. CONST. art. X, § 3, which provides a
homestead and personalty exemption from process; and TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (West 1997),
which provides a personal property exemption from garnishment, attachment, execution, or other seizure.
Foreign havens such as the Cook Islands trusts that Professor LoPucki describes, see LoPucki, supra
note I, at 33-38, are principally used by individuals and not by corporations. See 2 DUNCAN OStiORNE,
ASSET PROTECTION § 19:04 (1995) (describing offshore trusts as appropriate for wealthy professionals,
entrepreneurs, and heirs).
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analysis principally to potential judgment proofing by publicly traded
companies. Most individuals have always been judgment proof, and few
private companies can cause sufficient statutory or tortious liability to cause
a significant social problem. If Professor LoPucki is mainly concerned with
contract liability, he has turned upon his own thesis. If he is actually concerned
with individuals or private companies, he is dealing with a problem of modest
social consequence.
Professor LoPucki identifies four judgment-proofing strategies. First is the
granting of secured debt. -3 Under both state law and federal bankruptcy law,
the typical perfected secured creditor must be fully satisfied before money is
paid to a competing tort or statutory claimant. ' There are some exceptions
to these rules, but they are not significant for tort claimants. ' Professor
LoPucki correctly identifies Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code as a
convenient and inexpensive way of granting secured credit and as a law that
facilitates the granting of more secured credit than the former law would have
allowed.
Second, Professor LoPucki identifies 'ownership strategies,"2' 7 i.e., ways
in which a potential debtor can put its assets into the hands of third parties
while yet continuing to enjoy the benefits normally associated with ownership.
The most obvious of these is to create liability in a thinly capitalized
subsidiary and then to devise a way to transfer the profits that are generated
in the subsidiary into the hands of the parent. A second method, analogous to
the granting of a perfected security interest, is asset securitization, in which
companies sell their intangible assets to a person who is allowed to collect the
payments on those assets in preference to those who have tort and other claims
against the original seller.28 A variation on this theme is the "sale and
22. LoPucki's focus is. accordingly. pnmanl, on mass ton claims aganst lirms., since. vlh the
possible exception of some physicians, firms are the onl) ones that hae both the potential liability
exposure (i.e., the exposure that could result in a mass ton claim) and the funding to make the liability-
avoiding schemes that LoPucki outlines feasible. And yet Ahai is ne\% in LoPucki', scenano is not the
liability-avoiding measures, but the mass tort claim itself. Professor LoPucki treats the increasing number
of tori claims as an entirely natural feature of the legal landscape and take!. it for granted that it sould be
unjust to prevent plaintiffs in tort cases from collecting huge judgments But one might argue that an)
increase in unsatisfied tor claimants is due to the nsing number and size of tort claims and not to the
amount of assets available. The number of tort claims has in fact tncreased dramatically in recent year,
See Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tor Litigation: Fdig3 fnmi itin t mistitrefor Civil Jitices Researc'h.
48 OHIO ST. LJ. 479, 481 (1987) (noting a five-fold increase in product liability suit, from 1975 to 19851
23. See LoPucki. supra note I. at 14.
24. See, e.g.. U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301 (1996): I CoLtIER o% BAK r iM'iY I I 03(il (Laurence P
King ed. 1996) [hereinafter COLLIER] ('The Bankruptcy Code recognuers the rights of secured creditors
by providing for them to be paid first from the proceeds of their collateral ")
25. Notable exceptions protect purchase-money claimant% and siatutoo lien creditors, such a- holder-
of federal and state tax liens, see I I U.S.C. §§ 544-545: see a/io 5 CO.IER. 3uprta note 2-1. at 44 LH.
and mechanic's liens, see U.C.C. § 9-310.
26. See LoPucki, supra note I, at 19.
27. Id.
28. For a general description of asset secuntizalion. see Stesen L Schsarcz. The- Ahhen af!Asiet
SecuritiZation, I STAN. J.L. BUs. & FIN. 133 (1994).
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leaseback" of tangible assets-a transaction that puts the asset beyond the
reach of creditors, but allows the original owner to enjoy its use for a fee.29
Professor LoPucki's third category is "exemption strategies. 30 Under the
law of all states3I and under the Federal Bankruptcy Code,32 certain assets
may be held by individual debtors free from the claims of other parties.
Typically, these assets are items such as homesteads and life insurance. Such
laws cannot be used by firms that do business as corporations or
partnerships.33
A fourth category identified by Professor LoPucki is "foreign haven
strategies. 34 Under these strategies, an individual might put his assets in a
trust in the Cook Islands, for example, and continue to enjoy the benefits, yet,
under Cook Island law, be able to keep them free from the reach of creditors
in the United States.
As I suggest above, the last two categories-exemption strategies and
foreign haven strategies-are not relevant to corporate liability."5 They apply,
if at all, only in insignificant ways to firms in commercial activity and cannot
be used to protect corporate assets against tort and statutory claims of any
magnitude.
II. ECONOMIC THEORY AND REALITY
A. The Theoretical Problem
It is impossible to quarrel with Professor LoPucki's claim that it would be
a wonderful thing to play poker with the assurance of no loss and with the
possibility of great gain. Before I explain why this poker game probably does
not exist and why it is unlikely ever to exist, let me belabor the obvious by
using an example to show why an investor would welcome the opportunity that
Professor LoPucki posits.
Consider an investor who could borrow at 8% and earn a return on equity
of 20%. If this person put up $10 million of his own money and raised $90
million by selling equity to others, he would have to share the $20 million
29. As Professor LoPucki recognizes, the first two strategies, granting secured credit and selling assets,
will not suffice by themselves to judgment proof a debtor. If the transaction is for new value, and if the
assets acquired (the loan in the first case and the proceeds of the sale of the asset in the second) are held
in the debtor corporation and used in its business, these transactions "judgment proof' the debtor only if
they are not for fair value or if the assets received in a fair value exchange are then transferred to the
shareholders or others without receiving fair value for them. Of course, granting secured credit might be
regarded as a judgment-proofing strategy as between two existing creditors where one, but not the other,
has received security after both of them have lent to the debtor unsecured.
30. LoPucki, supra note I, at 30.
31. See 14 COLLIER, supra note 24, 1 Intro.03.
32. See II U.S.C. § 522(d) (1994).
33. See id. (covering individual debtors only); see also 4 COLLIER, suprat note 24, 9191 522.02 to. 11.
34. LoPucki, supra note I, at 32.
35. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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return each year with the other equity holders. As the owner of one-tenth of
the equity, the investor would be entitled to only $2 million (a 20% return).
If, on the other hand, the investor could purchase all of the equity for $10
million, and procure the remainder of his capital by borrowing $90 million at
8%, his return on the same transaction (after interest) would be $12.8 million
(a 128% return). More leverage means not only more gains to the equity
owners on success, but also fewer losses to the equity owners on failure. If one
assumes a corporation with no debt, the equity owners lose $100 million on
its failure. The owners of a corporation with $90 million in debt, on the other
hand, lose only their $10 million; the remaining $90 million loss is borne by
the creditors.
In theory, therefore, playing "without chips" (i.e., playing with a creditor's
money) both enlarges the equity holders' possibility for gain and diminishes
their possibility for loss. But this is a remarkable poker game; others play with
me as though I have invested $100 million in chips when I win, and treat me
as though I have invested only $10 million when I lose.
The poker metaphor reveals the problem with the hypothesis. No one will
allow a person to play poker unless that person puts chips in the pot and
thereby commits himself to pay if he loses. In the hypothetical leveraged
corporation, the creditors who are asked to put up $90 million of the chips will
understand that their chips stand behind only $10 million of capital and will
appreciate that they will lose $90 million if the business fails. Understanding
that they are being made to take the risks that are traditionally assigned to the
equity holders, but appreciating that they will not enjoy the gains of equity
holders, the lenders will either refuse to make the loan or insist upon a share
of the gains that looks much like the payment that would have to be made to
an equity holder. Put another way, the lenders to such a highly leveraged
business will behave like equity holders and will insist upon the control and
payment that normally goes to equity holders, even though they are technically
creditors. The changes wrought by the contract creditors (bringing about the
end of a business or diminishing its leverage) will also protect the involuntary
creditors.36
B. Financial Data on Corporate Judgment Proofing
If economic theory is at odds with Professor LoPucki's assertions.
economic reality is even more so. Conceding the accuracy of his claims on the
ease with which security interests can be granted and on the growth of asset
securitization, I find little empirical evidence to support Professor LoPucki's
36. I discuss the symbiotic relationship between contract creditors and inoluntar) creditors in/ra
Section ItI.A. By insisting upon debtor behavior that will protect their own interests. contract creditors often
require the debtor to take action (buying insurance or holding free assets) that %%ill alWo protect the
involuntary creditors' interests.
1998] 1369
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hypothesis and much to challenge it. His evidence is fragmentary and
idiosyncratic.37 To test his hypothesis I have collected and analyzed asset,
liability, and secured debt data on all companies in Standard & Poor's
Compustat database. 3' Far from suggesting that the "major players are
reducing their stakes, 39 the data show that the major players' stakes have
been essentially unchanged over the past fifteen years. Finally, I also consider
the amount and kind of insurance that American companies purchased during
that time. Since liability insurance covering a particular risk is a proxy for
assets that could be used to satisfy persons injured by occurrence of a risked
event, insurance is a substitute for assets that judgment creditors could
otherwise take.
37. For example, Professor LoPucki distorts the data on bankruptcy, see LoPucki, .upra note I, at 18,
by drawing inferences about judgment proofing from data compiled mostly from personal bankruptcies; his
discussion of insurance, see id. at 71, is skewed by questionable assumptions; and his arguments about
corporate liability avoidance, see id. at 3, are not borne out by empirical data on corporate assets as a
percentage of liabilities. Much of Professor LoPucki's article is written in the subjunctive, and consists of
statements about what "might," e.g., id. at 7, 12, 13, what "would," e.g., id. at 4, 9, II, or what "could,"
e.g., id. at 5, 7, 8, happen. These statements are incapable of rigorous empirical verification or refutation.
Moreover, where Professor LoPucki does undertake to support his argument with empirical data, these data
provide questionable support for his thesis. For example, Professor LoPucki cites a report that
approximately 60% of Texas attorneys do not carry malpractice insurance in support of the general claim
that most individuals and businesses are judgment proof. See id. at 4 n.5.
38. The Compustat database is a compilation of public financial data for publicly traded companies.
Compustat provides more than 300 annual and 100 quarterly data items taken from SEC filings and
Standard & Poor's company contacts. Companies are not included if they do not meet a sales or trading
requirement. For example, Compustat's 1997 data include 78% of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
listings on the University of Chicago's CRSP database, 78% of CRSP's AMEX listings, and 92% of
CRSP's NASDAQ listings. Most of the listings that are not in the Compustat database arc closed-end
mutual funds. Of the 577 NYSE listings in CRSP that are not in Compustat, 336 are closed-end funds
(including, e.g., 61 Nuveen funds), 106 are Shares of Beneficial Interest (SBIs), 35 are American
Depository Receipts (ADIs), 4 are Units, and 96 are other kinds of ordinary common shares.
The Compustat data items I used were: No. 6 Total Assets (current assets plus net property, plant and
equipment, and other noncurrent assets including intangible assets, deferred items, and investments and
advances); No. 24 Common Share Price (year-end); No. 25 Common Shares Outstanding (year-end); No.
181 Total Liabilities (current liabilities plus deferred taxes, other liabilities, long-term debt, and minority
interest); and No. 241 Total Secured Debt (long-term debt secured by a mortgage, property, receivable, and
stock or other assets). These data items were retrieved for companies for the years 1981-1995 inclusive.
The data items were then used to calculate (1) Secured Debt as a Percentage of Assets (Total Secured Debt
divided by Total Assets); (2) Assets as a Percentage of Liability (Total Assets divided by Total Liabilities);
and (3) Market Capitalization (Common Share Price multiplied by Common Shares Outstanding). For
Assets as a Percentage of Liability, if either data item was unavailable, then that company's data were not
included. The data for 1995 consist of entries for firms with fiscal year-end months of June to December;
data for firms with fiscal year-end months of January to May were not available.
For several reasons, I do not regard the omission of private companies from the Compustat database
as significant. First, Professor LoPucki's claim concerns commercial businesses, most of which arc public.
See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 5 (referring to "large businesses" and "their competitors"). Second, most
significant tort and statutory liabilities are caused by public companies such as Johns-Manville, A.H.
Robins, Exxon, Amoco, and Union Carbide, to name a few. It is an unusual private firm that will have
sufficient assets and a sufficiently wide distribution system to cause tort or other liabilities that will reach
far enough beyond coverage of its assets or insurance to be a significant social problem.
39. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 3.
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1. Secured Debt to Assets
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code makes it easier and less
expensive for a business debtor to grant an unassailable security interest to a
creditor in most or all of its personal property than was formerly the case)
But Professor LoPucki claims more-specifically that debtors are granting
more security than they were before Article 9 was enacted, thus leaving less
for involuntary creditors." To test the hypothesis that more secured credit is
being granted, I examined the secured credit of companies in the database. In
1981, there were more than 5000 companies in the database. By 1994, that
number had grown to more than 7000. Nearly 6000 of those 7000 reported
either that they had granted secured credit on their assets or that they had
not.42 The remaining 1300 companies in the database did not report that they
had granted secured credit, but they also did not report that they had not
40. See id. at 19.
41. See id. at 18.
42. The year-by-year data are as follows:
NUMIBER OF COMPAIES USED
YEAR To CALCL LATE.
SECURED DEBT ASSETS AS A
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granted secured credit.
43
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Chart 1 shows the mean and median percentage of assets that are subject
to security interest by year for American public companies. In 1981, the mean
company had secured debt equal to 12% of its assets. The median company
had even less secured credit, granting only four units of secured credit for each
100 units of assets. From 1981 to 1995, those percentages fluctuated'slightly,
but they generally declined. In 1995, the mean company had granted security
on only 10% of its assets, and the secured debt of the median company was
down to approximately 1% of assets.
Suspecting that smaller companies might differ from larger companies in
their amount of secured debt, I examined the 200 largest companies (as
measured by market capitalization) in the database and compared their
outcomes with the 200 smallest. The largest companies granted insignificant
amounts of secured debt. In 1981, the mean large company had granted
secured debt on approximately 2.5% of all its assets; the median large
company had granted security on less than 1% of its assets. Over time, these
numbers decreased, so that by 1995 the median company among the largest
200 had granted security on less than 0.1% of its assets. The declining median
43. Exactly why some of these companies made no report is unclear. Based on a spot check, it is my
hypothesis that most of the companies that reported neither the presence of secured credit nor its absence
had in fact granted none. The SEC requires companies, as part of normal financial disclosure, to report the
granting of security in their footnotes. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-08(b) (1997) ("Assets mortgaged, pledged,
or otherwise subject to lien, and the approximate amounts thereof, shall be designated and the obligations
collateralized briefly identified."). None of the excluded companies had done that, and I therefore assume
that most (though probably not all of them) had not granted any significant secured credit.
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shows that a decreasing number of companies are taking on significant secured
debt; the declining mean shows that the amount of secured debt has also been
decreasing.
Small companies granted more security, and their level of security was
more variable. Their mean ranged from 14% (secured credit divided by assets)
in 1981, up to a high of more than 16% in 1989, and then down to
approximately 12.5% in 1995. The median numbers went through a similar
range, from approximately 5% at the outset to approximately 1% in 1995.
If the mean and median are the relevant numbers, the message is clear:
Companies grant only a limited amount of secured credit, and, over the
fourteen years from 1981 through 1995, the amount of secured credit as a
percentage of the assets of those companies has declined. Of course, the means
and medians could be misleading. They might hide a large number of
companies with no secured debt, and a smaller but significant number with
large amounts of secured debt. To test that possibility, I looked at the
percentage of companies in the database that had different levels of secured
debt as a percentage of assets in six different years.











Secumd Oebt aS P rontage of ASJII
Chart 2' portrays the percentage in six separate years-1981, 1984,
1987, 1990, 1993, and 1995. In 1981, 25.7% of the companies had no secured
debt, another 27.8% had secured debt equal to 5% or less of their assets, and
44. Chart 2 shows the distribution of the "Secured Debt as a Percentage of Assets" %anable for all
companies in the "Full Data Set." The lower axis is dtiided into rangcb of "Secured Debt as a Percentage
of Assets," and the data points for each range indicate the percentage of companies faling into that range
each year.
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an additional 12.8% had secured debt of 6% to 10%. As the years went on, the
percentage of companies that had any significant secured debt steadily
declined. By 1995, 39.8% of the companies in the database had no secured
debt, 25.7% had from 1% to 5%, and 7.7% had from 6% to 10% of secured
debt. Thus, by 1995, 73.2% of all the companies in the database that reported
on this issue had secured debt that was less than 10% of their total assets. In
all years, only a trivial number of companies granted security in more than half
their assets.
If, as Professor LoPucki argues, major players are reducing their stakes by
means of granting security interests, one would expect larger numbers of
companies in every year to have granted security interests covering a larger
percentage of their assets. Moreover, one would expect a trend contrary to the
one that is disclosed, namely a rising percentage of assets covered by security,
not a falling percentage. But not only does the percentage of assets that are
subject to a security interest appear to be declining, it is also quite small in
each year. By 1995, only 22.1% of all companies had granted security interests
in more than 15% of their assets. Moreover, the trend over the fourteen-year
period is contrary to Professor LoPucki's hypothesis: The number of
companies with significant secured debt is declining, not rising. In short,
corporate debtors are not beggaring potential tort claimants by granting security
interests in their assets.
2. Assets to Liabilities
Granting secured debt is only one of the ways that a firm could immunize
itself against claims of prospective tort claimants. Professor LoPucki correctly
notes that disposing of assets has the same consequences for a prospective
judgment holder as granting security would have. 45 An industrial firm might
sell its machinery and lease it back. The creditor of the selling company would
be unable to reach the leased asset upon the "lessee's" default. Under the
Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, those assets would
ultimately go to the lessor, not to the creditors of the lessee.46 Securitization
has the same effect, with respect to intangibles, allowing a firm to dispose of
its intangible assets (usually accounts receivable or the like) to a trustee. 7 The
trustee issues beneficial interests in the trust and sells them to investors.48
These interests entitle the investor to receive the payments from the account
debtors that would normally go to the firm. This transaction, of course, is
similar to granting a perfected security interest in one's accounts. In both a
securitization and a sale-and-leaseback transaction, the asset is put beyond the
45. See LoPucki, supra note I, at 25-26.
46. See II U.S.C. §§ 365, 541 (1994); U.C.C. § 2A-307 (1996).
47. See Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 135.
48. See id.
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reach of the seller's creditors, who must satisfy themselves with the sale's
proceeds. 9 Professor LoPucki recognizes that securitization has become much
more widespread within the last ten years than was formerly the case, and he
identifies it as one of the ways companies are judgment proofing themselves.5
0
The asset-to-liability ratio directly measures the extent to which firms are
impoverishing themselves by transferring assets to third parties through sale-
and-leaseback transactions, securitization, payment of excessive dividends, or
any other mode of disposition for less than face value. The percentage also
measures the extent to which firms accomplish the same end by remaining
undercapitalized from their founding, or rendering themselves undercapitalized
by making losses. The data prove that the companies in the database are for
the most part adequately capitalized; their asset-to-liability ratio does not
decline over time.










81 82 83 84 85 88 87 88 9 90 91 82 3 8.4 S5
Year
49. Remember that the sale of an asset is not enough alone to judgment proof a debtor If tie sale is
for fair value, the proceeds of the sale will replace the asset on the debtor's balance sheet and thus lease
the debtor in exactly the same position after the sale as before. To use asset secuntization. sales and
leasebacks, or the like to judgment proof oneself requires a second step. namely the disposition of the net
proceeds by dividends to shareholders or by other transfers for less than fair value
50. See LoPucki, supra note I. at 23-30. Similar but less significant dispositions can be fraudulent
conveyances or gifts to family members or to others. For example. one can set up a trust in the Cook
Islands and, at least theoretically, enjoy the benefits of the assets sshe keeping the assets beyond the reach
of one's creditors. See id. at 32 n.142 (citing sources). I do not concern myself %%1h those transactions
Typically, they involve (and I suspect always will involve) only individuals and not companies But see
Steven R. Strahler, Personal Preseraation: Developers Go Offshore To Sae Sill. CRAi %'s Ciii B. S .May
6, 1991, at 17 (discussing developers who have shifted assets into offshore trusts) Some guarantors of real
estate debt are apparently using these techniques to avoid liability in business guarantees See td The
techniques are relevant to this Essay only to the extent that they become %%idespread among business
individuals who could cause significant tort liability, such as physicians
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Consider first the means and medians shown in Chart 3.51 In every year,
the median company in the database had between $1.67 and $1.85 in assets for
every dollar of liability. Note that the median percentages descend from 1983
through 1989 and then ascend from 1989 to 1994. This change may stem from
the recession of 1990; losses that occurred in those years could easily account
for the decline and later rise in solvency. In any case, there is no perceivable
long-term trend. The medians for all data are remarkably constant, hovering
near $1.75.
The data for the smallest 200 companies in the database and for the largest
200 companies in the database are not distinctly different from the data for all
firms. Large companies tended to be more stable between 1981 and 1995; their
mean and median percentages declined slowly, from 188% in 1981 to 174%
in 1995. The corresponding median values were 181% and 154%. In the small
companies, on the other hand, median percentages for assets and liabilities
fluctuated between 127% and 170%, and the means fluctuated between 300%
and 850%.
51. Chart 3 shows the mean and median percentage values of the "Assets as a Percentage of Liability"
for all companies each year. "Assets as a Percentage of Liability" for a given company is defined as the
total assets of that company divided by the total liabilities of that company. The data are as follows:
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The only data that give any support to the suggestion that corporations are
becoming more leveraged over time are the medians and means of the largest
200 firms, where one sees a small but perceptible decrease over time. But the
median company still has more than $1.50 of assets for every dollar of liability
in every year, and the mean company still has more than S1.70 of assets for
every dollar of liability in every year. Since the net assets of the mean and
median companies in the largest 200 companies more than doubled between
1981 and 1994, the modest decline in the ratio during that time is not real
evidence of judgment proofing. Neither the small companies nor the combined
data show any similar progressive decline in solvency.
Examining the actual distribution in Chart 4 for six of the years in this
setting shows only a modest change in the distribution of companies' solvency.






Assets as a Percentage ot 1labilles
The majority of the companies in the sample have between $1.00 and S2.00
of assets for each dollar of liabilities. In 1981, there was a slightly larger
representation in the $1.50 to $2.00 range, whereas between 1981 and 1995
there was a gradual shift so that there is now a larger number of companies
that have a ratio of between $1.00 and $1.50. In the early, years, from 1981 to
1986, there was a gradual shift to the left, toward lower asset ratios. Between
52. Chart 4 shows the distribution of the-"Assets as a Percentage of Liabilities*'" for all comnpanies in
the "Full Data Set" for five years. 'Me lower axis is divided into rungec, of "'Assets as, a Percentage of
Liabilities," and the data points for each range indicate the percentage of companies f'allhng i to that range
each year. The "Full Data Set" used to generate this, chart represent!. thosc comnpanies in the Cornputat
Industrial Annual Files for the years 1981, 1984, 1987. 1990. 1993. and 1995 for ,.%,hich total hadblltlc and
total assets were reported.
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1990 and 1995, there has been a shift the other way, toward more assets for
each dollar of liability.
In a final effort to tease any judgment proofers out of the data, I identified
a number of industries-chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and hazardous waste
management-whose manufacturing processes or products seem to have the
largest possibility of causing catastrophic tort or other liability. The data are
summarized in Chart 5.
CHART 5. ASSETS AS A PERCENTAGE OF
LIABILITIES-SELECTED INDUSTRIES
1400











--- Hazardous Waste Management-1-Petroleum
In general, the data show these apparently risky businesses to be as well
capitalized as others and, in some cases, to be much better capitalized than the
average company. For example, pharmaceutical companies had more than
$5.00 of assets for every dollar of debt in most of the years between 1981 and
1995. Like the data for all companies, and the data for small and large
companies, the data on these selected and apparently risky businesses show no
evidence of judgment proofing and, by some interpretation, show the opposite.
The message from all of the data across years and among industries and
in businesses of different size is consistent: There is no pattern toward a lower
asset-to-liability ratio. These data conflict with the claim that firms are
practicing the most plausible mode of judgment proofing, the outright
disposition of assets or the operation of thinly capitalized businesses.
Against these data-these direct measures ofjudgment proofing-Professor
LoPucki offers only the barest inference from dividends in bankruptcy cases.
Dividends to creditors in bankruptcy were lower in 1992 than in 1976 and
1998] Corporate Judgment Proofing 1379
lower in 1976 than in 1926." From this decline in bankruptcy dividends,
Professor LoPucki apparently infers that firms are becoming more highly
leveraged than before. Accepting the doubtful proposition that distributions at
the end of a firm's bankruptcy are a measure of the leverage of that firm
before bankruptcy,54  Professor LoPucki's data still do not justify his
inference. His data, at least for the later years, are drawn from all bankruptcies,
yet the vast majority of bankruptcies are individual, nonbusiness bankruptcies.
In 1980, about 87% of bankruptcies were nonbusiness bankruptcies; by 1996,
that number had increased to more than 95%. The great majority of
bankruptcies-especially for individuals-are filed under Chapter 7; in
1993, approximately 94% of Chapter 7 bankruptcies were filed by
individuals. 57 Despite their small number, business bankruptcies represented
the lion's share of the distributions in Chapter 7.V' Because Professor LoPucki
calculates his percentages on an undifferentiated mass of business and personal
bankruptcies-where more than 90% of the cases are personal and where each
personal bankruptcy carries the same weight as a much larger business case
does-it is possible that both the rise in the percentage of "no-asset" cases
(where there are no payments to general creditors) and the decline in payments
53. See LoPucki. supra note I. at 18.
54. There are many reasons that the current distributions in bankruptcy compared %ktht those of years
ago are not a reliable measure of leverage. First. the comnparatisc solsenc) of busmesses exiting bankruptcy
is a function of the courts' leniency to debtors and the speed of bankruptcy la% If. as currently is the case.
companies are allowed to linger long tn Chapter II. the distrbution to creditors at the end of such lingering
death would be much lower than it would be under other regimes in luch procedures ended earlier
Second, rules on priority and administratise expenses can hase a substantial impact on distribution
to creditors. To the extent that administrative expenses for las',ers and operation of the business are
expanded-as appears to be the case under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. II USC § 507
(1994)-there will be smaller distributions to existing creditors upon liquidation This should be true e'en
if one held constant the amount of leverage of the company at the tine it entered bankruptcy
Third, the amount of distributions to creditors at the end of a bankruptcy may also be a function of
when, for various reasons, a bankruptcy is commenced. If. for example, companies found it in their interests
to declare Chapter I I early under one regime. but later under another, the ditnmbution to creditors "ould
be different under the two regimes even if the amount of lescrage in firms generally uere the same in both
cases.
Against my direct and palpable measure of leverage. Professor LoPucki offers indirect, fragmentary.
and problematic data. See LoPucki. supra note I. at 52-53 (offering esidencc of tint%' leserage only
through data from firms in bankruptcy): see also infra note 58
55. See American Bankruptcy Institute. Banirnptic Statitis (isited Oct 6. 1997)
<http://www.abiworld.org/stats/statsfvant.html>.
56. See id.
57. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Baniinqitci Data (siitcd Nos 6. 1997)
<ftp://bankrup.com/Bankruptcy-Statistics/1980_to_ 1994- Statistics>
58. Professor LoPucki cites a General Accounting Office (GAO) report that anal,,,es data from 1991.
1992, but he does not mention that almost all of the bankruptcies analyzed in the report are indi'.idual
bankruptcies. See LoPucki. supra note I, at 18 n.69 (citing U S GLS% ACCOL %isG OrltwL. BAsKRLPTCY
ADMINISTRATION: CASE RECEIPrS PAID TO CREDITORS ANt) PROFESStOALS I (1994)) So the
overwhelming majonty of bankruptcies Professor LoPucki discusses are bankruptcies liled by indi iduals.
mostly poor individuals. In fact. the GAO report notes that %%tile onl 5% of the Chapter 7 cases sere asset
cases, business cases accounted for most of the recosenes by creditors 77% of the dollars distributed to
creditors in Chapter 7 cases came from business bankruptcies, and 83% of asset cases in sthich the
recoveries were greater than S500.000 were business bankruptcies See U S Gt N ACCOt ,-nIG OFFwE.
supra, at 7, 34 tbl. I1.2.
The Yale Law Journal
in asset cases (as a percentage of claims made) are attributable exclusively to
changes in the personal bankruptcy cases. It is no secret that the inclusion of
personal exemptions in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978"9 and the
concurrent enlargement of state law exemptions, and the further expansion of
personal exemptions in the bankruptcy amendments of 199460 have facilitated
personal bankruptcy without payment to any general creditor.6
3. Insurance
The amount of liability insurance carried by American firms may serve as
an alternative measure of judgment proofing. Buying liability insurance is
inconsistent with judgment proofing; the insurance stands in lieu of assets, and
the insurance premium in lieu of their cost.
Because Professor LoPucki's claim is so broad-American companies are
taking their chips off the table-one need not examine the activities in
particular industries to challenge this thesis. Accordingly, I have collected
liability insurance data for general liability of American commercial business,
for medical malpractice liability, and for workers' compensation liability.
Separately and together, these data show no significant changes between 1981
and 1995. Chart 6 plots the percentage increase of losses incurred in each year
under "other liability" policies (i.e., business liability policies) issued to
American firms and under workers' compensation and medical malpractice
policies. These are the policies that will respond to liability for personal injury
or property damage arising from the insured's negligence, commission of strict
tort, breach of warranty, or the like.62
59. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at I I U.S.C. § 522).
60. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106; see also 4 COLLIER, supra
note 24, 1 522.09.
61. Implicit in Professor LoPucki's thesis is the notion that social attitudes are changing to make the
kinds of financial and legal structures utilized by persons wishing to avoid liability more acceptable. Yet,
while he integrates this element into his argument in some places, in others he fails to do so. While
focusing on the increased role of secured debt in his discussion of bankruptcy, Professor LoPucki never
considers the reasons for the increased role of secured debt, such as an enormous increase in consumer debt
in general. In fact, "[c]onsumer debt ... has more than doubled in the past decade and is up 44% in the
last three years alone." Testimony of the American Bankruptcy Institute on Consumer Debt, Delinquencies
and Personal Bankruptcies Before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services of the U.S. House of
Representatives (visited Oct. 6, 1997) <http:llwww.abiworld.orgllegis/testimony/12sep96.html>. Another
factor might well be the sharp increase in consumer bankruptcy filings themselves, which have shown an
extremely strong correlation with consumer debt. See id. Total bankruptcy filings increased over 100% from
1980 to 1994, while the number of public companies filing for bankruptcy decreased 53% from 1985 to
1994. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 57. So not only are Professor LoPucki's
data flawed, but he fails to contextualize the data appropriately.
62. Insurance figures are from A.M. BEST Co., BEST's AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES:
PROPERTY-CASUALTY (1996); and A.M. BEST Co., BEST'S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES: PROPERTY-
CASUALTY (1990). Data items used were workers' compensation losses incurred, medical malpractice losses
incurred, and other liability losses incurred. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data are from U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES-1996, at 443 (1997).
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Chart 6 shows that covered losses tracked the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and, in fact, grew more rapidly than GDP between 1981 and 1995. If
one assumes that the losses generated by American business are more or less
proportional to business activity (as measured by GDP), the insurance coverage
for those losses in every year since 1981 has exceeded the insurance coverage
available for comparable losses in 1981. The chart shows the same to be true
of insurance for medical malpractice and workers' compensation.
How do these data contradict Professor LoPucki's hypothesis? If, as he
claims, businesses believe that they can render themselves judgment proof, it
is a waste of money to purchase liability insurance. By hypothesis, a firm's
liability insurance stands in the place of and protects its business assets. If a
firm has no business assets or has only assets that creditors have already
claimed, then it has no need for such insurance, and rational managers would
cancel their coverage. 63 That has not happened; there has been greater
insurance coverage in the 1990s than in the 1980s.
Because the data encompass all business risks and all liabilities, they do
not answer the question whether the companies in various industries where
there is high probability of tort injury have reduced their insurance coverage.
Likewise, the data do not show exclusions from coverage. For example, most
insurance companies have excluded asbestos injuries from their general liability
policies written in recent years.6 It is possible that the policies of 1995 had
63. Of course the creditors, particularly secured creditors, might insist upon insurance to prescr ,,e their
collateral or to preserve the debtor's earning capacity. Doubtless sonic part of the insurance that I hase
observed was purchased at the insistence of secured creditors
64. See Patrick J. Hagan et al.. Totalling Up the Costs of Asbesos Litigation Guess Who Wtill Pa
the Price?, 9 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECII. J. I. 15 (1990)
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significant exclusions that were not present in 1981, and thus that the insurance
written in 1981 for some risks was larger than that written in 1995, even
though the aggregate covered losses are greater in the later year.
Even with those qualifications, the continued maintenance of significant
liability insurance-at a level equal to or greater than the 1981 level-is an
embarrassment to Professor LoPucki's thesis. Professor LoPucki's primary
argument about insurance, however, envisions a world in which the liability-
avoiding measures he outlines have already taken effect; that is, a world where
liability is already dead.65 Although I have argued above that this world is
merely a fantasy, it is nevertheless worthwhile to examine Professor LoPucki's
argument on its own terms.
Professor LoPucki begins by asserting that "much, if not most, liability is
of an uninsurable nature" and that "purely accidental events cannot be
deterred. 66 Both of these statements are questionable, the second highly so.
If by "purely accidental" he means "absolutely unavoidable," then it is difficult
to argue with his statement, but it has no applicability to most accidents, which
are avoidable to some degree. If, on the other hand, Professor LoPucki means
what most people mean when they say "accidental" (i.e., "unintentional"), then
his statement is nonsense: Many unintentional events are avoidable and thus
deterrable.67
65. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 71. Throughout his article, Professor LoPucki uses the term
"liability" in two distinct senses. The first is the standard sense of a legal obligation or debt; the second,
as in his title, is a more particular sense of an enforceable legal obligation or debt. Professor LoPucki is
not arguing, after all, that the law will change in such a way that it will no longer be possible to bring tort
claims, but merely that corporations will arrange their assets in such a way that it will be impossible to
enforce them. His use of the word "liability" with two different meanings becomes confusing in his
discussion of insurance, where, for example, he says that .'[e]xperience' rating ... encourages the debtor
to avoid liability now so that future premiums will be lower." Id. at 73. Here, "avoid liability" seems to
mean "be careful so that tort claims will not be brought," not "hide assets," which is clearly the meaning
the phrase has when Professor LoPucki uses it earlier, in the statement "those businesses could avoid
liability if they so chose." Id. at 5.
66. Id. at 72. There are, of course, some things that are uninsurable-asbestos is a good example--but
I suspect that these uninsurable liabilities are less significant than one might imagine. For the most part,
a business tort liability becomes "uninsured" as to a company with liability insurance only because it is
explicitly excluded from the coverage. Policies are written to cover all losses arising from tort and the like
and it is then a job of the insurance company's drafter to write exclusions that will protect it from things
it does not wish to cover. In many cases, there are no applicable exclusions for the most serious injuries
precisely because neither the insurer nor the insured could foresee them and therefore the insurer could not
exclude them. For example, coverage for asbestos liability was not excepted from policies until the early
1980s. By that time the horse had already left the bam. Note as well that "not foreseeable" and
"unavoidable" are two different things: The extent of the asbestos litigation was surely not foreseeable, but
much of the damage was avoidable, since the asbestos companies knew for years that the substance was
dangerous. See PAUL M. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 10-22
(1985).
67. Professor LoPucki does conclude that "liability-producing events are rarely either purely intended
or purely accidental," LoPucki, supra note I, at 73, but he then moves on to other elements of his
argument, providing only abstract and highly tenuous support for his statement that "much, if not most,
liability is of an uninsurable nature," id. at 72. Later, as evidence for his claim that there exists "a vast
realm of uninsurable liability," id. at 75, Professor LoPucki lists intentional torts and "many new,
apparently risky kinds of activities," id., yet fails to provide a sound example of the latter. The sole
examples he supplies-biotechnology companies-are in fact insurable, as LoPucki himself admits. See id.
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Professor LoPucki further argues that liability insurance upsets the balance
of efficient levels of risk and thus works against the liability system because
it allows risk takers to engage in risky behavior and reimburses them when the
behavior produces liability.6" This statement, however, is only partly true. As
Professor LoPucki himself admits, schedule rating and experience rating align
the interests of insurer and insured-namely, the interest in avoiding liability-
generating conduct.69 But, Professor LoPucki continues, this situation holds
only for voluntary insurance.70 With judgment-proofing strategies in place, he
argues, firms will tend only to buy insurance involuntarily.
7t
Professor LoPucki then proceeds to the core of his argument, which
concerns a world in which all firms are judgment proof. He first argues:
As Chapter 11 is improved to make it more efficient, it will provide
a more cost-effective substitute for insurance. As Chapter II cases
become more common, the publicity individual cases receive can be
expected to decline. Debtors will tend to find it cheaper and less
stigmatizing to deal with their liability through Chapter II than
through liability insurance. 2
This argument is, of course, as impossible to disprove as it is impossible to
prove, for it involves not only an assumption of universal judgment proofing,
but also an assumption that Chapter I I will become cheaper and more efficient
than it is now. Yet, it is as easy to imagine a world in which firms are
judgment proof and Chapter 11 is more expensive and more stigmatizing than
insurance as it is to imagine a world in which firms are judgment proof and
Chapter 11 is less expensive and less stigmatizing than insurance. And
at 75 n.315. Since systematic intentional torts uould be a public relations death knell for most corporations.
they are irrelevant to his thesis.
68. See id. at 73.
69. See id.; see also Gary T. Schwartz. The Ethics and the Econoiws of Tort Lacbiltt Insurac e. 75
CORNELL L. REv. 313, 320 (1990) (arguing that schedule rating-in ,,hlch the insurer mpects the insured's
operations to adjust premiums-and expenence rating-in a, hich ihe insurer takes into account the liability
record of the insured-allow insurers to offer insurance that is almost "'perfectly responsi,.e")
70. See LoPucki, supra note I, at 76.
71. See id. Professor LoPucki recognizes that there ar reasons other than liability a% oidac to bu,
insurance; he lists the preference for insurance over Chapter II. the contract requirements of other firms
or individuals, avoidance of adverse publict. and moral obligation. See id For several other reason, for
firms to buy insurance, see David Meyers & Clifford W Smith. Jr. On the Corporate Demand for
Insurance. 55 J. BUS. 281 (1982). Meyers and Smith write
[Flor corporations with diffuse ownership[.] nsk a.ersion b% the Ovners apparentl, pros. ide- no
incentive for the purchase of insurance .... We argue that the corporate demand dere, [torl
the ability of insurance contracts to (I) allocate nsk to those of the finn's clirnholders %% ho
have a comparative advantage in risk beanng. (2) lower expected trans.actions costs of
bankruptcy, (3) provide real-service efficiencies in claims admtnistration. (41 monitor the
compliance of contractual provisions. (5) bond the limi's real mesiment decisions. 16) locr
the corporation's expected tax liability, and (7) reduce regulatory constraints ot trms
Id. at 293. To the extent that Professor LoPucki does not deal aith these factors. the) prov ide argutents
against his position as well.
72. LoPucki. supra note I. at 76.
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Professor LoPucki gives no reasons that we should imagine the latter instead
of the former.
Professor LoPucki's next argument-that bankruptcy might be preferable
to insurance 3_is equally tenuous. Here he argues that a well-drafted contract
can allow one party to the contract to go into bankruptcy instead of buying
insurance, while still providing for the fulfillment of the contract. 74 This
argument assumes that the insurance premium to be avoided by the contracting
party will exceed the costs of bankruptcy. The direct cost of bankruptcy-of
lawyers' and accountants' fees and time spent in court-can be considerable.
Less palpable, but not necessarily smaller, are the indirect costs of bankruptcy
in opportunities foregone because one must operate under court control, and
at sufferance to every creditor with sufficient anger or economic stake to
challenge an act as inappropriate under the Bankruptcy Code. Also onerous are
the indirect costs of damage to one's reputation in the business community. I
doubt there are many cases where these multiple costs of bankruptcy are less
than the cost of insurance.
Even if the cost of insurance were greater than the cost of bankruptcy, it
would still be contrary to the interest of most persons to choose the latter over
the former. As I suggest below, 75 most businesses have multiple contract
creditors. Those creditors, too, would be interested in the debtor's performance
and might insist upon insurance to protect against the debtor's avoiding its
liability to them while performing its executory obligations under § 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code7 6 for other creditors.
Remember finally that bankruptcy is a game played in court, a game which
brings with it all of the uncertainties of any other court proceeding. A
favorable outcome in bankruptcy depends upon many circumstances that are
beyond the control of the contracting parties: Will a trustee be appointed? Will
the creditors in the bankruptcy remove the management that had made the deal
and replace it with management that has no allegiance to any particular
contracting party? Will litigation bring other unforeseen calamities? In short,
insurance is clean, predictable, and largely beyond the control of the
contracting party. To trade that for the hope of performance by a bankrupt
seems a poor bargain to me.
Professor LoPucki's final argument is that pervasive judgment proofing
would lead to compulsory insurance, which would not solve the problem. He
offers four reasons: (1) In Professor LoPucki's imagined world, insureds have
no economic incentive to concern themselves with whether their insurers will
pay claims, so an insured will pay little attention to insurer solvency and will
73. See id. at 77.
74. See id.
75. See infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
76. II U.S.C. § 365 (1994).
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open the door for unscrupulous bankruptcy-prone insurers; (2) it would be
in the common interest of insureds and insurers to minimize coverage to the
extent permitted by law;78 (3) the incentive to provide accurate information
on insurance applications would disappear because the insured would no longer
care whether the insurer paid the loss, and it would not be possible for insurers
to deny coverage for fraud in the insurance application;'9 and (4) the
incentive to cooperate in processing claims also disappears, so insureds may
be reluctant to cooperate.
8 0
These arguments are easy to overcome. Making required coverage
relatively high and assessing penalties-in the form of higher premiums or
even criminal sanctions-for fraud or failure to cooperate in the processing of
claims would answer most of Professor LoPucki's concerns. Imposing stringent
requirements for the privilege of writing such insurance policies would solve
the remainder. Professor LoPucki's arguments concerning compulsory liability
insurance focus almost solely on compulsory automobile liability insurance,
and they extrapolate from conditions surrounding present-day automobile
liability insurance to conditions that will obtain in LoPucki's imagined world
of judgment-proof corporations.8 ' He argues that (1) since required coverage
under compulsory insurance is presently often lower than necessary for full
liability coverage, compulsory corporate liability insurance in the world where
corporations are judgment proof would also be at levels too low to provide full
liability coverage;8 2 (2) compulsory insurance has proved unenforceable with
respect to automobile liability insurance, and it must therefore prove
unenforceable with respect to corporate liability insurance;' and (3) insurance
companies would be required to write insurance policies for high-risk
enterprises at below-market rates, which would then force them to charge
above-market rates for other enterprises, thus subsidizing the high-risk
enterprises.'
Disregarding for the moment that Professor LoPucki's conclusions do not
even appear to follow from his premises, I will attempt to show why his
conclusions are mistaken. Under his first point, Professor LoPucki states, "'We
can expect that a compulsory business liability insurance system would require
77. See LoPucki, supra note I, at 80.
78. See id. at 81.
79. See id. at 82.
80. See id. at 80-83. Of course, unless the insurance companies %,cre thensclscs judgmcrt proof. the)
would have a strong motivation to adopt policing strategtes to ensure cooperation and 'ccd out iraud
81. Here and elsewhere in his article, Professor LoPucki assumes ,,tthout argument that . teature of
today's world will persist into his judgment-proof world. And yet. %%hen one posits an imiaginary sorld.
it seems a false step to assume that certain features of today's world must suri.c Perhaps in a judgment-
proof world mass torts will not exist. Perhaps there will be unicorns and dragons Who can s.)
82. See LoPucki, supra note I. at 85.
83. See id. at 87.
84. See id. at 86.
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insurance only to low policy limits." 5 Yet the only evidence he supplies in
support of this assertion is data on present-day hazardous waste and auto
liability insurance.8 6 There is no reason to suppose that present-day conditions
must continue to obtain in Professor LoPucki's judgment-proof world; in fact,
there is considerable reason to suppose otherwise. It might very well be true
(indeed, the presence of financial responsibility laws in some states, to which
Professor LoPucki himself draws our attention, 7 suggests it is true) that
liability limits are so low because most firms and many drivers are not
presently judgment proof. If the average net assets for firms that produce or
handle hazardous waste is $1,000,000, liability insurance limits might well be
set about $1,000,000 below what would be required for full coverage of
liability in most instances. This situation would clearly not be the case in the
judgment-proof world that Professor LoPucki is asking us to imagine. In any
case, Professor LoPucki offers no reasons why the present low liability
coverage, which I assume for the sake of argument is often insufficient to
cover losses generated by bad drivers,"8 would not be in and of itself a
sufficient reason to make liability coverage higher under pervasive compulsory
insurance, since defects in legislation are often remedied at a later stage.
Professor LoPucki offers similar evidence for his other two points, and
similar objections can be made. He asserts that "[t]he problems of
implementation of compulsory automobile liability insurance are likely to be
repeated in the context of compulsory business liability insurance," 9 but this
need not be the case. Professor LoPucki seems here to be concerned with
problems of enforcement and cross-subsidization. Since premiums are
government controlled, compulsory automobile insurance is a losing
proposition for insurance companies.90 Not only is there no reason for
compulsory corporate liability insurance premiums to be lower than a fair
market price, there is actually sound reason that they should be higher than
fairly priced, i.e., that they should be money-making propositions for insurance
companies. Since compulsory insurance would, by hypothesis, be a substitute
for tort liability brought on by corporate liability avoidance, mandating high
premiums would provide some incentive for corporations not to make
themselves judgment proof. The compulsory insurance system could be
designed so that premiums are higher than fair market value, with insurance
85. Id. at 87.
86. See id. at 87 n.365.
87. See id. at 86.
88. In reality this is not the case. The average cost of a personal injury automobile accident is $9487.
See DEBORAH HENSLER, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 103 (1991).
Presumably, personal injury costs dwarf property damage costs, but even assuming that they are roughly
the same, the average cost of an auto accident is under $20,000. Most states mandate liability coverage in
excess of this amount.
89. LoPucki, supra note I, at 86.
90. See Suzanne Yelen, Withdrawal Restrictions in the Automobile Insurance Market, 102 YALE L.J.
1431, 1431 (1993).
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companies paying a direct federal tax (in some amount less than their profit
from the unfair premiums) to support the increased government regulatory
machinery that would be necessary to administer the compulsory insurance
program. Firms with sufficient assets available for tort judgments might be
excluded from the insurance requirement or get a rebate from their premiums.
There need be no assigned-risk policies at all: Riskier enterprises would
demand high premiums, and less risky ones, lower premiums. All this, of
course, is hypothetical; it shows, however, that there are sound hypothetical
responses to Professor LoPucki's hypothetical scenario.
Professor LoPucki states that there would be political issues connected
with compulsory insurance. 9' With this I agree. We differ, however, on what
these issues would be. Professor LoPucki notes in this regard: -'Conditioning
business opportunity on insurance is somewhat analogous to conditioning the
right to drive a car on insurance. Both are essential elements of individual
autonomy in modem society, the denial of which [is] not easily accepted." 2
He is clearly implying here that requiring insurance is tantamount to a denial
of the right. In general, however, opening a business requires assets in some
form. Assuming that there would be some class of businesses that would be
so risky that the additional amount of capital required to buy compulsory
insurance would deny some people the "right" to open such a business,' it
is unclear that this would become a divisive political issue. It does not seem
to bother too many people in today's society that many who would like to own
their own businesses do not have the financial wherewithal to do so.
Professor LoPucki argues, finally, that it is impossible to enforce a
compulsory automobile insurance scheme and that therefore one could not
enforce a compulsory business insurance scheme.' It seems, however, that
compulsory automobile insurance is easier to avoid than compulsory corporate
liability insurance. There are far more drivers than businesses in this country,
and, conversely, businesses are more prominent in their communities than
individual drivers. Businesses, in other words, are easier to spot than individual
drivers. A simple solution requiring that proof of insurance for the year be
attached to income tax returns would probably solve the problem. The
Treasury Department might, indeed, be the natural arm of government to look
to for enforcement of compulsory liability insurance.
91. See LoPucki. supra note I. at 85.
92. Id. at 86.
93. It is somewhat difficult to imagine ho% this could happen in the judgment-proof %%orld
Presumably, there would still be start-up costs in such a uorld. judgment prooling '%ould occur after the
business had been set up but before it had begun generating lijbilitN b% engaging in its paricular enterpnsc
In the course of judgment proofing, the assets of the business %%ould be secreted from poicntaal creditors
Would it not be possible to use some of these assets to bu) insurance
94. See LoPucki, supra note I. at 86.
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Professor LoPucki does admit that a compulsory insurance system could
conceivably preserve liability,95 but he is unwilling to entertain a fantasy
world of compulsory insurance. This argument is surprising because a
compulsory insurance world is a more orderly, more realistic, and altogether
more pleasant fantasy than the world in which firms commit mass torts with
impunity.
In sum, it is not likely that liability insurance will disappear. The data
from 1981 to the present do not show any decline in the purchase of liability
insurance; in fact, they show the reverse. For reasons that are discussed
below, 96 it is doubtful that we will ever experience the fantasy world in
which most commercial firms are judgment proof and their incentive to
maintain insurance is accordingly diminished. Should that world come to pass,
it is just as plausible as not that legislators would pass laws making it
prohibitively expensive for firms to avoid buying liability insurance.
4. Subsidiaries
The data set out above do not show the financial status of corporate
subsidiaries. Because the Compustat data are from consolidated balance sheets,
a subsidiary's assets and liabilities are reported in those data as though they
were the assets and liabilities of the parent company. Because there are only
consolidated data, reports on insurance and secured debt also fail to give any
reliable information about the financial status of wholly owned subsidiaries. To
explain the use of subsidiaries as a judgment-proofing device, I propose first
to set forth the reasons that corporations-particularly multinational
corporations with considerable exposure to tort claims-conduct much of their
business in subsidiaries. Second, I consider the deliberate, self-conscious steps
necessary to use a subsidiary as a successful judgment-proofing device. Third,
I discuss a handful of anecdotal tort cases involving subsidiaries.
Consider current use of subsidiaries and the reasons for their use.
According to Professor LoPucki's thesis, firms that engage in risky activity
should separately incorporate each risky endeavor and feed the profits back to
the parent. An examination of twenty-two randomly selected firms from
industries that might engage in this strategy (the petroleum, chemical, and
pharmaceutical industries) shows no significant trend toward increasing the
number of subsidiaries within corporate groups.97 Between 1988 and 1995,
95. See id. at 83. He then observes that "it is clear that it would, in the process, transform the liability
system almost beyond recognition." Id. at 88. Yet this would hardly be surprising because the liability
system would have died first anyway. Professor LoPucki seems to be suggesting, in effect, that the
transformation of the liability system under compulsory insurance is somehow an argument against
compulsory insurance-but if this is true, it is equally an argument against his entire article.
96. See infra Part II.
97. The following subsidiary information is from Disclosure, Inc.'s January 1988 and December 1996
CD-ROMs:
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twelve of the twenty-two companies had increased their number of
subsidiaries, eight had decreased their number, and two were constant.
To understand some of the legitimate reasons for using subsidiaries,
consider the case of Union Carbide. It has sixty-five subsidiaries, of which
thirty-nine are incorporated abroad. 9' Consider why management might have
chosen separately to incorporate various businesses even in circumstances in
which it was not judgment proofing itself by undercapitalizing those
subsidiaries.
When we consider the foreign subsidies, it is readily apparent that there
are at least two good reasons for doing business in a foreign country through
a subsidiary and not through the parent. First, local foreign law may require
local incorporation or that law may offer tax or other incentives for a local
NAME SUBSIDIARIES SUBSIDIARIES CIIA\GI.
- 11/88 12/95
Abbott Laboratories 105 105 0
Adams Resources and Energy 0 12 12
Air Products and Chemicals 14 27 13
Amerada Hess 12 14 2
American Pacific 2 12 10
Amoco 57 70 13
Atlantic Crown Richfield 2 4 2
Biogen 10 7 -3
Bristol-Meyers Squibb 226 236 10
Carrington Labs 4 7 3
Chevron 45 27 -18
Crown Central Petroleum 21 20 -1
Dow Chemical 201 317 116
E.I. DuPont 7 64 57
Eli Lilly 113 189 76
Exxon 50 74 24
Global Marine 31 31 0
Merck 147 115 -32
Pharmacia-Upjohn 53 5 -48
Schering Plough 172 141 -31
Sun 456 183 -273
Wamer Lambert 125 110 -15
98. See Disclosure, Inc. CD-ROM (Dec. 19961.
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incorporation.99 Even if there is no legal requirement, a large company may
not wish to expose all of its assets and operations to the control of legislative,
administrative, and executive agencies in a foreign country. Just as important,
it may not wish to expose all of its assets to the courts of that country.
Declining to expose all of a parent's assets to a foreign jurisdiction, however,
is not the same as judgment proofing a subsidiary from liability arising in that
country. A company such as Union Carbide, with a net worth of five billion
dollars, may be quite willing to expose a subsidiary with tens or hundreds of
millions of dollars net worth, but may be unwilling to expose its entire five
billion to the vagaries of a foreign legislature or a foreign court.'w
Domestic subsidiaries may be necessary to comply with particular
domestic law or to insulate the parent's operation from the control of a
particular domestic agency. Consider, for example, Union Carbide's Benefit
Capital Management. That subsidiary manages pension funds for Union
Carbide and was established to sell pension management advice to other
pension funds.'' As an advisor to third parties, it is licensed by the SEC and
submits to that agency's jurisdiction. It would have been awkward, conceivably
impossible, to comply with SEC requirements if the parent company were to
engage in that activity through a division and not a subsidiary. To expose all
of the acts of the parent company to SEC supervision and control would have
been both unnecessary and inefficient." 2
Doubtless some subsidiaries are maintained by happenstance. For example,
eleven of DuPont's current subsidiaries have the word "Conoco" in their
title. 0 3 Presumably, these subsidiaries came to DuPont with its acquisition
of the old Continental Oil Company.' Some of them may remain
subsidiaries only because they were acquired in that fashion.
Finally, there may be managerial and organizational efficiencies in
operating a particular business as a separately incorporated subsidiary and not
99. For a summary of incentives to incorporate subsidiaries in seven countries, see Yitzhak Hadari,
The Role of Tax Incentives in Attracting Foreign Investments in Selected Developing Countries and the
Desirable Policy, 24 INT'L LAW. 121 (1990). Some foreign laws restrict certain commercial activities to
local corporations. See, e.g., MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 27 ("Only Mexicans by birth or by naturalization
and Mexican companies have the right ... to obtain concessions for the exploitation of mines or waters.").
Moreover, the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 provide
benefits that depend on incorporation in a foreign country. See I.R.C. § 922(a)(1) (1994).
100. By allowing tens of millions of dollars to remain subject to judgment, corporations following this
strategy will be, by definition, not judgment proof.
101. See Directory: Money Managers, in CRAIN COMMERCIAL, INC. PENSIONS & INVESTMIENTS 42,
42 (May 12, 1997).
102. Consider also the reasons for Exxon's separate incorporation of its shipping subsidiary that owned
the Valdez. See Helen R. MacLeod, Legal Separation Helps Exxon Win Insurance Lawsuit, J. COM., June
14, 1996, at 8A (reporting that the Exxon Corporation won $350 million from insurers because money paid
to Exxon Shipping from an exclusive indemnity policy was not considered money paid to the Exxon
Corporation, and hence did not count against the policy limit).
103. See National Register Pub. Co., E.L Die Pont De Nemours & Co., available in LEXIS, COMPNY
Library, DCA File.
104. See Peter Behr, Critics Hit Du Pont-Conoco Merger, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1982, at D8.
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as a division. Making a person the CEO of a subsidiary instead of a "'division
director" may enhance that person's status and enable the firm to acquire better
executives more cheaply. There may also be organizational virtues in firmly
segregating one business from an unrelated business and so more readily
identifying and calculating its success and failure. I can only speculate on
those reasons.
In short, corporations have motivations other than judgment proofing for
maintaining subsidiaries. Corporate counsel of the oil and chemical companies
with whom I have communicated denied that their companies ever set up
subsidiaries with the intention of judgment proofing themselves.0 5 While
they acknowledge that they would assert their corporate separateness in certain
circumstances-particularly where jurisdiction is asserted in the United States
by a foreign plaintiff seeking a higher award than a plaintiff might be able to
obtain abroad-they denied that any of their operating subsidiaries were
undercapitalized and explained their existence with the reasons described
above.
Turn now to the acts that a corporation must undertake to use a subsidiary
as a judgment-proofing device. It is not enough merely to move the liability-
generating activities into the subsidiary. If those activities require assets for
their performance or if, as is likely, those same activities produce profits,
additional steps must be taken. In the first case, the parent company would
have to own the assets that generated the liability and lease them or otherwise
make them available to the subsidiary without exposing them to the
subsidiary's creditors. If substantial assets are left in the subsidiary-either
from the parent's capitalization or from profits earned on the liability
producing business-those assets will be available for tort claimants as well
as others. Thus, the profits will have to be distributed upstream in the form of
dividends, and any substantial assets acquired as capital (if those are required
to produce income) somehow must be held outside the subsidiary or otherwise
made unavailable to the subsidiary's creditors.
Finally, consider the anecdotal evidence concerning subsidiaries and
affiliates in notorious tort cases. Remember Union Carbide's response to the
Bhopal disaster.' °6 The American parent, Union Carbide, owned 50.9% of
Union Carbide India, Ltd. No Americans had worked at the Indian plant for
more than two years prior to the accident," 7 and the Indian subsidiary was
not undercapitalized by normal standards. On the other hand, the subsidiary did
105. See. e.g., Letter from Robert A. Butler. Chief Ling. Counsel. Union Carbide Corp. I-2 (Sept, 2.
1997) (on file with the Yale Law Journal): Letter from John Scddclmcyer. Counsel. Exxon Corp I (Jan.
23, 1998) (on file with the Yale Law Journal).
106. See Thomas J. Lueck, Union Carbide Set for Damage Suits, N.Y. TI'ME. Dec 7. 1984. at AI0.
107. See Robert A. Butler, Claims Against a Parent Corporation fromn the Perspective of In-House
Counsel, INT'L Q., Jan. 1989, at 126. 127. Keep in mind that a debtor's insolvency is not necessanly proof
that its managers or shareholders "judgment proofed" the company prior to that ,nsol~cncy See my
definition of "judgment proofing," supra note 2.
1998] 1391
The Yale Law Journal
not have enough assets to pay the kind of judgment that might have resulted
in an American court from liability to the several thousand claimants who had
suffered death or injury as a result of the leak of poisonous gas from the
Bhopal facility. The plaintiffs in that case pursued the parent in American
courts on what they called a "multinational enterprise liability" theory.'08 The
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the
American case on the grounds of forum non conveniens, but it conditioned the
dismissal on Union Carbide's consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of
India.' °9 After the American case had been dismissed, the Indian high court,
without trial, held that Union Carbide Corp. was "prima facie liable" and
would have to pay "interim compensation" of $192 million.'10 Thereupon the
case was settled; the parent paid the bulk of the settlement.,
Oil spills furnish additional examples. The Amoco Cadiz was an oil tanker
owned by a subsidiary of the parent company, Amoco International Oil
Company. In the American litigation over the oil spill resulting from the
Cadiz's grounding in France, the parent was found negligent in failing to repair
and maintain the tanker properly and in failing properly to train the crew
employed by its subsidiary.'1 2 The Exxon Valdez, meanwhile, was operated
by a subsidiary of Exxon, Exxon Shipping Company. Promptly after the
Valdez accident; the CEO of Exxon stated that the corporation would not
assert its corporate separateness and that the parent would assume liability for
damages that might arise as a result of the subsidiary's action." 3 In that case,
the parent might have had liability even if the corporate veil had not been
108. The plaintiffs pled: "The complex corporate structure of the multinational, with networks of
subsidiaries and divisions, makes it exceedingly difficult or even impossible to pinpoint responsibility for
the damage caused by the enterprise to discrete corporate units or individuals." Complaint, In re Union
Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(No. 85 Civ. 2696), cited in Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in
Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295, 333 (1996).
109. See In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 867; cf Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93-Civ-7527
(VLB), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18364, at *3 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1994) (noting that "accept[ing] the
jurisdiction of Ecuadoran courts [is] a potential prerequisite to dismissal of plaintiffs' damage claims on
grounds of forum non conveniens").
I10. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, 26/88 (Madhya Pradesh H.C. Apr. 4, 1988) (order
of Seth, J.). See generally Tim Covell, The Bhopal Disaster Litigation: It's Not Over Yet, 16 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 279 (1991).
111. Union Carbide Corp. paid $420 million of the $470 million settlement. See Charan Lal Sahu v.
Union Carbide (1989) I S.C.C. 674 (India); Charan Lal Sahu v. Union Carbide (1989) 2 S.C.C. 540 (India);
Charan Lal Sahu v. Union Carbide (1989) 3 S.C.C. 38 (India).
112. See In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1952).
113. See "Exxon Valdez" Oil Spill and Its Environmental and Maritime Implications: Het(ring Before
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong. 47 (1989) (statement of LG.
Raw], Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Exxon Corp.) ("[Exxon) take[s] full
responsibility. As we have done from the very beginning."). Even though Exxon Corporation initially
denied criminal responsibility, see Oil-Spill Indictment: Exxon Claims No Crininal Liabili for Wrongs
of Subsidiary, A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 28, 28 (quoting an Exxon Corporation lawyer as saying, "After
looking at the indictment, I have absolutely no idea of why my client was even named"), the corporation
eventually accepted criminal responsibility, see Michael Weisskopf, In Plea Bargain, Exxon Accepts
Crintinal Liability; $100 Million Alaska Spill Fine Is Largest, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1991, at A3.
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pierced because its medical department had been involved in the return to duty
of the captain, who was alleged (after his rehabilitation treatment) to have been
drinking shortly before the accident, and because it was the owner of the
cargo." 4 Under Alaskan law, the owner of cargo would have shared liability
for environmental pollution."5
Breast implant litigation provides a final example. Dow Coming Corp. is
owned 50% by each of its parents, Dow Chemical and Coming, Inc. Dow
Coming was established as a subsidiary of the two companies during World
War II to produce products made of silicone-long before breast implants were
any part of its business." 6 By 1989, Dow Coming had sales of S1.5 billion,
ranking 254 in the Fortune 500 by sales, and assets of S1.6 billion, ranking
218 in the Fortune 500 by assets."17 In 1984, Dow Coming had net income
of $91 million from sales of $855 million, sufficient to rank it 355 in the
Fortune 500. "' It could not be described as undercapitalized, much less
judgment proof. In one breast implant case, Dow Chemical successfully
asserted its corporate separateness,"19 but in another the plaintiffs successfully
reinstated Dow Chemical as a defendant on the theory that Dow itself had
liability for providing toxicological testing services to Dow Coming.-
Of course, these cases are only anecdotes. They are not a firm base upon
which to build a systematic argument about judgment proofing through wholly
owned subsidiaries. But they do give a map of the terrain that confronts a
lawyer advising a large pharmaceutical, chemical, or oil company. And the
terrain is not inviting for a firm that wishes to judgment proof itself by
engaging in a risky business through a wholly owned subsidiary.' 2'
114. See Emily Barker, Tie Eyaon Trial. AM. LAW.. No' 1994. at 68. 70
115. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.758 (Michie 1996) (establishing inct liabiltty for the "'oner'" of the
cargo at the time the vessel was loaded).
116. See Joan E. Rigdon, Coning Is Feeling tie Heat a Breast hplant Debacle. WAI . ST I , Jan
29, 1992, at B4.
117. See The Fortune 500. FORTUNE. Apr. 23. 1990. at 346. 356
118. See Dow Corning Corp. Announces Record '84 Sales and Profits. PR. Ne. %.%ire. Jan 28. 1985.
available in Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS Database.
119. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.. 837 F Supp 1128 (N D Ala- 1993)
(holding that plaintiffs could not pierce the corporate sell). see al.to Temporomandibular Joint Implant
Recipients v. Dow Chem. Co. (li re Temporomandibular Joint Implants Prods Liab- Litng ). 113 F 3d 1484
(8th Cir. 1997) (dismissing Dow Chemical as a defendant in a silicone jav, implants case)
120. See Spitzfaden v. Dow Coming Corp.. No. 92-2589. 1995 U S Dist. LEXIS 16787 iE D La-
Nov. 8, 1995); see also Lindsey v. Dow Chem. Co. thn re Dows Coming Corp ). 113 F3d 565 t6th Cir
1997) (consolidating breast implant cases against Dos Chemical)
121. Other notorious tort-induced bankruptcy cases show no t idence of successful judgitct proot ing
through use of subsidiaries. See. e.g., Kane v. Johns-Man 'Ile Corp. 843 F2d 636 t2d Cir 1988).
Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co. 828 F2d 239 (4th Cir 1987). Keene Corp
v. Coleman (In re Keene Corp.). 164 B.R. 844 (Bankr S.D.N Y 1994) In each of those cases it appears
that all of the assets of the parent company ssere put into the bankruptc) and that an) immunity of the
corporate parent was not successfully asserted.
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III. WHY COMMERCIAL FIRMS WILL NOT BECOME JUDGMENT PROOF
The data and anecdotes set out above convince me that Professor LoPucki
is wrong. The numbers show little secured credit, little leveraging, and much
liability insurance. Nor are the trends in the direction he predicts: During the
last fifteen years there has been no systematic increase in secured lending, no
systematic reduction in free assets of American firms, and no systematic
reduction in liability insurance. In all of the prominent tort cases, parents
answered for their subsidiaries' sins. In short, I have uncovered no empirical
evidence for the proposition that American firms, in general, have judgment
proofed themselves or are judgment proofing themselves. But the data do not
foreclose the possibility that Professor LoPucki's claims will turn out to be
correct in the future. By examining the reasons that firms have not rendered
themselves judgment proof, I propose to explain the data and to show why
Professor LoPucki's predictions are as wrong as his statements about the
present.
No single part of the American legal or economic structure explains why
judgment proofing is not widespread. Indeed, I see at least nine related but
discrete reasons for businesses to maintain substantial assets or insurance in
lieu of assets. Some constraints-like state laws that mandate
insurance-directly limit a firm's choices, and the very concerns that animate
Professor LoPucki have surely motivated their creation. Others-such as
concern about a company's public image and pressure from potential joint
tortfeasors-operate more on the margins of corporate decisionmaking. The
enterprises with which we are concerned are diverse; they range from oil
producers to pharmaceutical companies to car manufacturers to medical
providers. Each faces a different set of pressures-legal, practical, and
economic-but I see no significant subset of enterprises that does not face
important legal, practical, or economic barriers to judgment proofing.
Raised to its highest level of generality, Professor LoPucki's thesis is that
equity holders can increase their wealth by taking on more liability (or, the
same, by disposing of assets while holding liabilities constant). Surely
Professor LoPucki is not challenging the iron law of corporate finance that
made Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller"' z famous-namely that a firm
does not change its total value by splitting its cash flow into different streams
(in this case, one for creditors and one for common stockholders). He must be
making a lesser claim-namely that shareholders can enhance their value by
taking some of the value of the firm from the debtholders while the
debtholders are not watching. This would be possible if the debtholders were
foolish or if the only debtholders were tort claimants who could not bargain.
122. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Invesiment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261 (1958).
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But absent those possibilities, one would expect the debtholders to command
their fair share-a share of the profits that would roughly offset the present
cost of their prospective losses because of the added leverage of the firm.
So the rules of corporate finance present some serious-I think ultimately
indefeasible-obstacles to Professor LoPucki's hypothesis. The following
section shows that corporate finance theory is likely to be an insurmountable
obstacle for the LoPucki hypothesis, and the eight subsequent sections survey
smaller, but still significant, hurdles.
A. Contract Creditors
If one ignores the tax benefit from the deductibility of interest and
excludes firms with very high debt ratios, standard corporate finance theory
states that a firm that has a certain percentage of debt and a different
percentage of equity will have the same value as a firm whose ratios are
reversed.123 But that example obscures the important point for our purposes.
We are not interested in the value of the entire firm, but in the relative
distribution of value between debt and equity. As Professor LoPucki
instinctively appreciates, the value of equity would rise as the amount of debt
rises-at least if the cost per unit of debt could be held constant (i.e., if the
interest rate and other costs do not rise as the amount of debt rises). The
converse happens to the debt; as debt rises as a percentage of total
capitalization, the present cost of the risk of financial distress increases, and
the comparative value of the debt declines. At some point, the value of the
debt probably declines exponentially as risk of distress becomes greater and
greater. 
124
Because debt imposes a fixed obligation to pay interest and principal, the
risk of financial distress brought on by inability to meet that obligation
increases as the share of debt increases. Creditors understand this and thus
would insist upon a higher interest rate from highly leveraged firms to offset
the present value of the risk of financial distress. In the words of Professors
Brealey and Meyers:
The costs of bankruptcy come out of the shareholders' pockets.
Creditors foresee the costs and foresee that the), will pay them if
123. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C MEYERS. PRICII'IJ.S Of- CORPORATI- Ft',\ctl 447
(5th ed. 1996).
124. See id. at 461. Whether a firm in practice with some debt has greater %alue thin one vIth all
equity (because interest payments on debt are deductible and dividends are not in the current American
income tax system) is subject to dispute among finance experts. See. e g.. ,Morton Hi Miller. Debt and
Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261. 262 (1977) (noting that "[e]ven in a %%orld in vhtch interest payments are fully
deductible in computing corporate income taxes. the value of the firm in equilibnum %%ll still be
independent of its capital structure"). Less controversial is the proposition that the valuc of the firm declines
as the percentage of debt reaches some high level and thus itself undergoes an exponential decline in value
See BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 123. at 485
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default occurs. For this reason they demand compensation in advance
in the form of higher payoffs when the firm does not default. That is,
they demand a higher promised interest rate. This reduces the possible
payoffs to shareholders and reduces the present market value of their
shares.'I
That, in a nutshell, demonstrates the fundamental flaw in Professor LoPucki's
thesis. Contract creditors will appreciate the risk to them when firms make
themselves judgment proof and will demand corresponding compensation.
12 6
But how does this principle apply to tort claimants who are at least
nonadjusting (i.e., claimants who cannot adjust or bargain based on risk) and
probably nonexistent? They can hardly demand a payment for their greater but
still unperceived risk. To understand how tort claimants are protected, consider
the firm and the relationship of its creditors--contract and tort. As I have
explained,1 7  the firms that concern us (and should concern Professor
LoPucki) are those that might perpetrate mass torts and be subject to large
statutory liability. To create that kind of liability, a firm must usually have
assets in the form of mines, manufacturing facilities, distribution capacity,
crude oil carriers, or the like. To commit large torts, one must do large
business, and to do large business normally requires substantial assets. 28 If
the firm has procured such assets through borrowing, it will have significant
contract creditors. If the firm procures assets by the sale of equity, the firm
will have a cushion of assets available for tort creditors. Thus the firms with
which we are really concerned are those with substantial assets and
corresponding contract debt.
Without intending to do so, the contract creditors' pursuit of their own
interest also protects the interests of the nonadjusting creditors about whom
Professor LoPucki is concerned. To see this, return to my hypothetical firm.
125. BREALEY & MEYERS, supra note 123, at 487.
126. The interest and aggressiveness of contract creditors vary widely. The creditors with the most to
lose from financial failure are probably the managers of the business, for they will likely lose their
jobs---either at once or through the Chapter I I process. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA.
L. REv. 669, 675 (1993). Almost as vigilant are bond and venture trustees whose very existence is fulfilling
their fiduciary duty to a particular set of creditors by monitoring the operations of the debtor. See Saul
Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 72 (1982).
After them will be a variety of other creditors and financial intermediaries who may vary considerably in
their ability and willingness to monitor the debtor.
127. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
128. This observation is both theoretically probable and empirically verifiable. For example, Union
Carbide had several billion dollars in assets at the time of the Bhopal disaster. See Bradford C. Mank,
Preventing Bhopal: "Dead Zones" and Toxic Death Risk Index Taxes, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 795 (1992).
Exxon, which continues to litigate the Valdez oil spill, is currently the third largest industrial company in
the United States and has $84 billion in assets. See Charles M. Camp, Shreds of Exxon Evidence: Lawyers
Wage War over Admissible Testimony, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 21, 1994, at IH. Johns Manville
had $1.1 billion in net assets before declaring bankruptcy due to the asbestos litigation. See William D.
Marbach et al., An Asbestos Bankruptcy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1982, at 54. In only the last case were the
company's assets insufficient to meet tort claims.
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If, in our $100 million enterprise, there were $99 million of equity and $1
million of debt--or the reverse, $I million of equity and $99 million of
debt-how would the creditors holding that debt behave differently? The
former would be a highly capitalized company with little chance of failure and
with high probability that it would be capable of paying off the $1 million of
debt notwithstanding sharp reverses. The opposite would be true of the latter.
Assuming our 8% interest hypothesis, the former would have annual interest
liability of only $80,000; the latter's liability vould approach S800,000-an
annual interest claim almost equal to its capital. One would expect the latter
firm to have trouble meeting its interest and principal obligations any time it
suffered losses for even a short period.
The holder of the $99 million of debt would not be oblivious to these
concerns. Creditors would appreciate the increased riskiness of the S99 million
loan and would behave differently from the creditors of the highly capitalized
firm. A creditor asked to undertake $99 million of debt in a company whose
net worth is negative or barely positive might refuse to lend because the
prospective firm was so thinly capitalized. If it agreed to make the loan, it
would charge a much higher interest rate than in the first case. Moreover, the
creditor might expect to enjoy the rights of an equity owner since it would find
itself in the position of an equity owner in even a modest downturn of the
company's business. Among an equity owner's rights are the right to control
the business and to share in its profits. Thus, if our hypothetical creditor were
willing to make the $99 million loan, one would expect it to insist upon
complex terms granting it rights to control the business decisions of the debtor.
One might also expect it to insist upon a high interest rate and perhaps on a
share of the profits in case the company were profitable (in the trade, an
"equity kicker")., 29
The vigilance of contract creditors can protect tort claimants in one of two
ways. First, the refusal of contract creditors to lend may abort a risky business
entirely. If so, the potential tort claims never arise and the potential victims are
never injured. More likely, conditions that the prospective contract creditors
will demand before lending to a judgment proof company may prove to be so
costly that the debtor will choose to capitalize the company more full), to avoid
those costs. In any case, the vigilance of the contract creditors protects the tort
claimants and others.
30
129. If the contract creditors take too man)' steps toward equity status. they may be treated by the
courts as equity holders rather than debtholders. See. e g. Mathns % Sargent. No 86 CIV 0370 (MJL).
1991 WL 79219, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 7. 1991) ("The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business ..Martin % Pay ton. 158 N E 77.
79-80 (N.Y. 1927).
130. Consider a typical loan document clause that prohibits disposition of assets
Restriction on Disposition of Assets.
Subject to the provisions of Article Eight. the Company %%ill not. othcrse than in the
ordinary course of business, sell. lease. transfer or other%% ise dispose of any substantial part of
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Of course, the interests of the contract creditors and the nonadjusting tort
creditors are not exactly aligned. Indeed, the contract creditors might take
security and thus protect themselves to the detriment of later tort
claimants. 131 Why do we not observe this? The creditor may fear that the
assets-even with a value equal to the amount of the debt while the concern
is operating-will be inadequate to satisfy their claims on default. For
its properties and assets, including (but without limitation), any manufacturing plant or
substantially all properties and assets constituting the business of a division, branch or other unit
operation.
AMERICAN BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS, 1965, MODEL
DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS, ALL REGISTERED ISSUES, 1967, AND CERTAIN NEGOTIABLE
PROVISIONS WHICH MAY BE INCLUDED IN A PARTICULAR INCORPORATING INDENTURE 427 (1971). Also
consider a typical clause for limitation of debt:
Limitation on Debt of the Company and Subsidiaries.
Neither the Company nor any Subsidiary will incur or otherwise become liable in respect
of any Debt other than
(I) in the case of the Company,
(a) unsecured Current Debt incurred in the ordinary course of business as a result
of borrowing; provided, that there has been a period of [x] consecutive days within the
period of [y] consecutive months immediately preceding the date of the incurring or
renewal of such Debt during which the Company has been free from Current Debt
resulting from borrowing (excluding prepayments, fixed sinking fund payments or other
payments required to be made with respect to Debt incurred as Funded Debt),
(b) unsecured Senior Funded Debt; provided that the Company shall not incur any
such Debt if, immediately after giving effect to the incurring of such Debt and the receipt
and application of the proceeds thereof, (i) the aggregate principal amount of Consolidated
Senior Funded Debt would exceed [z]% of the aggregate amount of Consolidated Net
Tangible Assets; or (ii) the aggregate principal amount of Consolidated Funded Debt
would exceed [a]% of the aggregate amount of Consolidated Net Tangible Assets,
(c) Subordinated Debt; provided, however, that the Company shall not incur any
such Debt if, immediately after giving effect to the incurring of such Debt and the receipt
and application of the proceeds thereof, the aggregate principal amount of Consolidated
Funded Debt would exceed [b]% of the aggregate amount of Consolidated Net Tangible
Assets, and
(d) unsecured Senior Funded Debt incurred for the purpose of (and substantially
concurrently with the) refunding of any Senior Funded Debt and Subordinated Debt
incurred for the purpose of (and substantially concurrently with the) refunding of any
Senior Funded Debt or Subordinated Debt; provided that the Senior Funded Debt or
Subordinated Debt being refunded was permitted by this Indenture;
(2) in the case of any Subsidiary, Debt owing to the Company or to a [Wholly-Owned]
Subsidiary;
(3) in the case of the Company and any Subsidiary,
(a) Debt for taxes, assessments and governmental charges or levies and claims for
labor, materials and supplies (as and to the extent permitted to remain unpaid and
undischarged by § 10-4),
(b) secured Debt as and to the extent permitted to be secured by § 10-10,
(c) Debt represented by dividends declared but not paid, subject, however, in the
case of the Company, to the provisions of § 10-12, and
(d) unsecured Current Debt incurred in the ordinary course of business and not as
a result of borrowing or in respect of obligations of others.
Id. at 398-399. Kahan and Tuckman report that covenants in sales of assets appear in private debt issues
in 85% of investment grade issues and 95% of junk grade issues, while limitations on debt appear in 100%
of private debt issues and 91% of public ones. See Marcel Kahan & Bud Tuckman, Private vs. Public
Lending: Evidence from Covenants (Harvard Law Sch. Program in Law and Econ. Paper No. 151, Feb.
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
13 I. The contract creditors of a subsidiary could achieve the same end by receiving a guaranty of its
indebtedness from the parent.
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example, inventory purchased for $100 million may turn out to be worth only
$10 or $20 million on the default of the business when inventory has to be
scrapped or sold at low prices to others. In addition, the agency cost imposed
on the debtor by the security interest in the form of restrictions on the
operation of the debtor's business may be large enough to dissuade the debtor
from secured borrowing. 132 Even with security, the creditor may still regard
itself as the equity holder and therefore insist upon control over the behavior
of the debtor and even upon a share of the profits. These are at least plausible
explanations for the absence of large numbers of liability-producing companies
whose available assets are subject to secured creditors' claims.
In unusual circumstances, a liability-generating company can be set up
even though it has neither significant assets nor contract debt. The model for
this transaction is a taxi company whose only fixed asset is a single taxicab
and whose principal value derives from the owner's service in driving the
taxicab. Beyond such small-scale service providers,"' such businesses are
surely rare. Moreover, where such firms can generate liability without the
presence of contract creditors to control their behavior, other actors (such as
potential joint tortfeasors and government licensing agencies) may limit
judgment proofing.
B. Subsidiaries
In Subsection II.B.4, I argued that subsidiaries are not widely used as
judgment-proofing devices. Why not? Surely corporations create subsidiaries
to insulate themselves and other subsidiaries from some liabilities.' Why,
then, do firms not use their subsidiaries to reduce their liability to zero? There
are at least seven reasons.
First, some of the reasons that the parent will not judgment proof itself
apply equally to its subsidiaries. Concerns about both public perception and the
government's use of its discretionary power apply equally to judgment
proofing directly and to judgment proofing by means of a subsidiary.
132. For a general discussion of the reasons thai secured debt is not is %,idespread as one might
predict, see Ronald J. Mann, E.rplaining the Pattern of Secured Creit. 110 HARv L RI"% 625. 668-83
(1997). See also Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit m Sinall.Business Lending. 86 GO o LJ I
(1997) [hereinafter Mann, Small-Business Lending]; Ronald J. Mann. Strare" and Force in the Liquidaton
of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159 (1997).
133. Other examples include surgeons and an occasional sale proprietor such as a contractor
134. Professor LoPucki is, of course, correct when he notes that "[corporation, in general and
subsidiaries in particular limit liabilities." LoPucki. supra note I. at 21 nn.78-79 1 dra% a distinction
between judgment proofing and more conventional limitation of liability to some lesel aboe zero, but
below infinity. I concede that subsidiaries, like many of the devices discussed in this Essay. can be and are
used to judgment proof in some cases. I argue only that the device is not widely used for this purpose and
that there is good reason why only a limited number of outhers do use subsidianes as a judgment-proofing
device.
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Second, using subsidiaries can be costly. The mere establishment of a
wholly owned subsidiary does not judgment proof a parent from liability. If the
parent's assets must be put into the subsidiary to do its business, then those
assets are at risk, and if the subsidiary is successful, its earnings must be
removed from the subsidiary to maintain its judgment-proof status. Like its
parent, the subsidiary will not be able to borrow substantial sums and yet
remain judgment proof, for contract creditors will require protection for
themselves, as described in the previous section. Thus, to put substantial assets
into the subsidiary the parent must ensure that the subsidiary obtains assets
free and clear, contract creditors receive appropriate payments, or that the
parent guaranties the contract creditors' liability. Depending upon the particular
circumstances and how the judgment proofing is to be achieved, the cost of
these assurances may be substantial and may outweigh the apparent benefits.
Third, a parent may be liable for its own involvement in the subsidiary's
actionable behavior, thus making their corporate separation irrelevant. Recall
the cases of the Amoco Cadiz, 135 the Exxon Valdez, 136 Dow Chemical,'37
and Union Carbide. 138 In all four cases, plaintiffs argued that the parent was
liable, not because the corporate veil should be lifted, but because of the
parent's own actions. If a parent is inevitably involved with the acts of a
subsidiary in perpetrating mass torts and if, therefore, a plausible claim can be
routinely made for direct liability against the parent, judgment proofing by
establishing a subsidiary is impossible and the costs of attempted judgment
proofing will be wasted. Based upon the available evidence, it is impossible
to tell how often a plaintiff can mount a plausible case against the parent, but
there are at least several prominent and clear examples where the claim has
been successfully made.
139
135. See In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992); see also supra note 112
and accompanying text.
136. See In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991); see also supra notes 113-115 and
accompanying text.
137. See In re Silicone Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Ala. 1995); see
also supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
138. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F.
Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also supra notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
139. There are other cases in which courts have found parents directly liable for their subsidiaries'
torts. See, e.g., Gardner v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 1348 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding the parent
liable for torts of its subsidiary's personnel); Anglo Eastern Bulkships Ltd. v. Ameron Inc., 556 F. Supp.
1198, 1202-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding a parent liable for defects in its representations of subsidiary's
products). Courts also attribute liability in cases where the parent and subsidiary share a common corporate
group. See, e.g., Dunn Appraisal Co. v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 687 F.2d 877, 881 (6th Cir. 1982)
(finding a parent liable when the plaintiff did not realize there were two different companies); Erickson v.
Curtis Ins. Co., 432 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. App. 1988) (finding that the parent of the lessee of a parking rmp
owes a duty to the lessee's customer); Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 742 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1987) (holding
that it is sufficient to claim that the parent owned and supplied defective machinery used by the subsidiary).
For a general discussion of direct parental liability, see PHILLIP 1. BLUMBERO, LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT
AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 14 (1987).
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Fourth, courts retain the power to pierce the corporate veil. One suspects
that piercing the corporate veil is easy to threaten but hard to do. But consider
our case: By hypothesis, the subsidiary is wholly owned and is being used as
a judgment-proofing device. To achieve judgment proofing, a parent must do
more than set up a properly capitalized subsidiary. The parent must routinely
drain the subsidiary of its assets while satisfying the subsidiary's contract
creditors. Yet these are the very acts by which courts justify piercing the
corporate veil. For example, in Eastridge Developmeni Co. : Halpert
Associates, 40 a parent acquired a subsidiary, cancelled its insurance, and
channeled the revenues directly to the parent. When the parent learned of a tort
claim against the subsidiary for actions that had been taken before the parent's
acquisition, the parent sold off assets to itself and to other insiders and
collected all of the accounts receivable. The court pierced the corporate
veil. '
4'
The argument that computerized recordkeeping will make it easier for
corporate parents to observe required corporate formalities' "2 does not blunt
the claim in cases like Eastridge. Even when the parent keeps proper records
and observes appropriate corporate formalities, a wholly owned and thinly
capitalized subsidiary that transmits its profits upstream and is subject to
control by its parent is a likely object of a successful veil-piercing
argument.'43 In summary, the cases on piercing the corporate veil with
respect to parents and wholly owned subsidiaries should give pause to a
corporate lawyer advising a parent considering an attempt to judgment proof
itself through creation of a subsidiary.' Although the tests for veil piercing
are hardly precise, their factors coincide more or less with the acts a parent
140. 853 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1988).
141. See id. at 780.
142. See LoPucki, supra note I. at 47 (making thi, argument)
143. In United States v. Jon-T Chemicals. Inc.. 768 F2d 686 5th Cir 1985i. the court listed the
following factors, among others, as releant in detemining ,,hcn to pierce the corporate ',etl common
directors and officers, consolidated financial statements, the parent's financing of tie ,ubidiary, the
parent's arranging the incorporation of the subsidiary. grossly inadequate captial. the parent', pameni of
salaries and other expenses of the subsidiary, and the subsidan 's ha'.mg no busmess except that gt',en to
it by the parent. See id. at 691-92.
144. Courts also sometimes impose enterprise liability if it is difficult to attribute liability to a ,ingle
corporate entity in a complex corporate group. See Piuti ,t' I Bt.t %BIF:RG. L-\ Of- ('ORPOR %T1 GKtOI PS
STATUTORY LAW-SPECIFIC 993 (1992) ("[Legislatures. agencies. and courts are incressingl) turning to
enterprise principles for a more effective resolution of legal problems minoling corporate groups In a
growing number of areas, entity law is clearly eroding, and [there is an] increasing acceptance ot enterprise
principles .... ); BLUMBERG, supra note 139. § 8 ("Tori las,% principles that hase become increamngly
accepted strongly support the recognition of enterprise liability in place of traditional entity la.'. -j. Barry
R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability and Health Care Reforn .M anaging Care and .Mhnai ltni Risk. 39 ST
Louis U. LJ. 77, 80 (1994) (describing the increasing use of enterprise liability in health care) While
Professor LoPucki is concerned that corporate entity law is killing liability, another commentator feels that
corporate entity law is being killed by, among other things. expanding enterprise habilit) See Stephen B
Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Linitted Liabilit. Denocracr. and Econoiic s. 87 Nw
U. L. REv. 148, 148 (1992).
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would have to take to insulate itself from liability generated by a
subsidiary.1
45
Fifth, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51,46  which concerns
Consolidated Financial Statements, makes judgment proofing through a
subsidiary less attractive. That rule, published by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB), requires that the financial statements of "all
companies in which a parent has a controlling financial interest ... shall be
consolidated."' 47 Of course, the consolidation rule requires only that the
parent show the subsidiary's liability on its balance sheet as its own-not that
it become liable to the subsidiary's creditors. Nevertheless, inclusion of the
subsidiary's liability on the parent's balance sheet may have adverse
consequences for the parent. For example, the parent itself may fall into default
under the terms of its own borrowing if its ratio of assets to liabilities-shown
on its consolidated balance sheet-falls below a certain number. Thus, a
parent's bringing a subsidiary's liability to its balance sheet might open the
parent to suits, foreclosure, or the like from its own creditors when the
covenants in its own loan agreements are broken.
148
145. The tests for piercing the veil also coincide with the traditional justifications for tort liability, i.e.,
deterrence, retribution, etc. Subsidiaries that obey proper corporate formalities and operate in their own self-
interest will not sacrifice themselves for their parents. When a subsidiary operates against its own interest
and in the interest of the parent (e.g., the subsidiary makes above market-rate lease, licensing or other
payments to the parent), that is good evidence that the subsidiary is controlled by the parent or that the
subsidiary is an instrumentality or alter ego of the parent, two factors most often associated (97% and 95%,
respectively) with court decisions that pierce the veil. See Robert Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1064 (1991). Undercapitalization is also a significant factor in veil-piercing
cases. An empirical study of veil-piercing cases found that courts pierced the veil in 40% of the 1583 cases
examined. See id. at 1048. There were 120 cases in which the courts found undercapitalization; they pierced
the veil in 88 (73%) of those cases. See id. at 1064.
For specific cases piercing the corporate veil or refusing the parent summary judgment against a veil-
piercing attempt, see Slottow v. American Casualty Co., 10 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993), which found
undercapitalization alone adequate to justify piercing the corporate veil under California law; In re Oil Spill
by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1303 (7th Cir. 1992), which found Amoco liable for its subsidiary's
oil spill (the parent was "so highly integrated each of the subsidiaries was a mere instrumentality of the
parent corporation"); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1447 (N.D. Ala.
1995), which denied summary judgment for the parent-defendant because a jury could find that the
subsidiary was the alter ego of the parent; Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), which pierced
the veil to reach stockholders of taxicab companies; Montgomery Health Care Facility, Inc. v. Ballard, 565
So. 2d 221 (Ala. 1990), which held the parent of a nursing home liable for the nursing home's negligence
when the parent controlled the operations of the nursing home; Green v. Champion Insurance Co., 577 So.
2d 249 (La. App. 1991), which found that an insurance company and related entities were a "single
business enterprise," thereby allowing creditors to reach assets of affiliated entities; and Brandimarti v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 527 A.2d 134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), which held the parent liable when its
subsidiary used the trade name of the parent on a harmful product, even though the parent was not involved
in the manufacture, distribution, or sale of the product. See also STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE
CORPORATE VEIL §§ 2.08, 2.22 (1991) (discussing Delaware and Massachusetts as two jurisdictions that
have traditionally made it difficult to pierce the veil but are now making it easier).
146. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 51 (1959).
147. Id. 13.
148. Note that the 1987 amendment to Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51 strengthened the rule by
removing two exceptions to the consolidation requirement. Formerly, a parent was obliged to consolidate
neither "non-homogenous" operations nor those involved in a foreign location. The 1987 amendment
removed those exceptions and required consolidation even of non-homogenous and foreign subsidiaries.
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Sixth, fraudulent conveyance law provides a potential obstacle.
Presumably, firms engage in risky businesses because those businesses offer
correspondingly high rates of return. Businesses that manufacture cigarettes or
pharmaceuticals, for example, may offer not only high potential liability, but
also high potential profit. To keep a profitable subsidiary judgment proof
requires that profits be distributed routinely to the parent as dividends so that
the earnings are not available to tort and other claimants. The distribution of
those dividends may be a fraudulent conveyance. The most direct analogy is
a lesser-included case-where a wholly owned subsidiary guaranties the
liability of its parent. Some commentators and a few cases suggest that a
subsidiary's guarantying of a parent's or sister's liability is itself a fraudulent
conveyance.'4 9 The guaranty engenders no value for the subsidiary unless,
of course, the parent and the subsidiary are engaged in a joint business
operation from which the subsidiary also benefits.'I 0 When the payment is
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51 % crc amended to read
2. The usual condition for a controlling financial interest is o.nership of a majority '.omg
interest, and therefore, as a general rule ownership b) one company, directl) or indirectl, of
over fifty percent of the outstanding voting shares of another company is a condition pointing
toward consolidation. However, there are exceptions to this general rule A majonty-oned
subsidiary shall not be consolidated if control is likely to be temporary or if It does not re-t .. ith
the majority owner (as. for instance, if the subsidiary is in legal reorganization or in bankruptc)
or operates under foreign exchange restrictions, controls, or other govermentally imposed
uncertainties so severe that they cast significant doubt on the parent's ability to control the
subsidiary).
3. All majority-owned subsidiaries-all companies in vhich a parent has a controlling tinancial
interest through direct or indirect ownership of a majority voting interest-shall be consolidated
except those described in the last sentence of paragraph 2
FINANCIAL ACCOUNING STANDARDS BD., FINANCIAL A'COL 'nTNG StiFRs. STArtEME'r o- FINA'NCIAL
ACCOUNTNG STANDARDS No. 94, at 5 (1987).
149. Guaranties and other transfers will be void if either (1) the transferor ,.as (or ,,as thereby
rendered) insolvent and received no fair consideration; or (2) there vas an intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors. See Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp. 919 F2d 206. 214 3d Cir
1990) (finding actual and constructive intent to defraud in a transfer of assets from one .. holly owncd
corporation to another); Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir 19811 t.acating
the lower court's finding of no fraudulent conveyance in a transfer of assets '.,here the lovcr court did not
properly consider issues of fair consideration and insolvency of the transferor). Gough . Titu, (In re
Christian & Porter Aluminum Co.), 584 F.2d 326. 337 (9th Cir 1978) (holding that a transfer to a third
party not made for fair consideration is a fraudulent conscyance). Central Nat'l Bank . Coleman tin re
B-F Bldg. Corp.). 312 F.2d 691 (6th Cir. 1963) (holding the guaranty of a sister's debt to be a tranitcr
without fair consideration); Edward Hines W. Pine Co. v First Nat'l Bank. 61 F2d 503 t7th Cir 1932)
(holding that an insolvent company that made an assignment to pay its president's slster', debt intended
to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors). See generalIy Kenneth J Carl. Fraudulent lrun3Jer AttacLs un
Guaranties i Bankruptcy, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109 (1986).
150. See In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc.. 841 F.2d 198. 201 (7th Cir 1988) (holding that although
it is dangerous when a parent "causes one of its subsidianes to guarantee another's (or the parent's o.%n)
debts ... a guarantee of an affiliate's debt is enforceable pros ided that the guarantor denves iome benefit.
even if indirect, from the guarantee" (citations omitted)): Klein . Tabatchnick. 610 1- 2d 1042. 1047 t2d
Cir. 1979) (holding that the transaction's benefit to the debtor "'need not be direct" and "ma) come
indirectly through benefit to a third person"): Telefest. Inc %. V'T Inc. 591 F Supp 1368 (D NJ
1984) (holding that a guaranty by a solvent corporation %%as not a fraudulent conve)ance and noting that
indirect benefit may provide the necessary fair consideration). Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co %
Goldman (In re Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp.). 446 F Supp 586. 591 (W D N Y 1978) (stating that key
factors involved in determining whether a subsidiary's guaranty of a parent's habilit), or tee versa. is in
furtherance of the corporate purpose and thus valid are "'the closeness of business relationship bctv'.een the
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made upstream as a dividend and without any promise or prospect of a quid
pro quo from the parent to the subsidiary, the potential for fraudulent
conveyance is even more obvious. Moreover, the prospects for a successful
claim of fraudulent conveyance increase in direct proportion to the self-
consciousness of the parent's act. If intentional judgment proofing is disclosed
(typically through a memorandum in the parent's file or the testimony of a
disaffected former employee) as the purpose for the establishment of the
subsidiary and the upstreaming of its revenues, one could even make the case
for an intentional fraudulent conveyance. 15
Seventh, state and federal statutes that explicitly decline to recognize
corporate separateness of parties might thwart judgment proofing through
subsidiaries. The most notable of these is the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 52 which provides
for the liability of not only actual polluters, but also owners, operators, or
arrangers in certain circumstances. 53 For example, in United States v. TIC
Investment Corp., 54 the court found that the parent was liable as an
"arranger" where it had some control over the subsidiary's "arrangement for
disposal."'' 5 5 Similarly, some states' environmental laws disregard corporate
separateness by requiring insurance or bond to protect judgment creditors not
corporations, any commonality of shareholders, officers and directors, the reasons for guarantying another's
debts or for granting a security interest to secure such indebtedness, and the beneficial results expected to
be derived therefrom"); id. (finding the transaction in furtherance of a corporate purpose yet void on the
basis of the insolvency of the transferor).
151. In Arnold v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2351 (1994), the Tax Court found a constructive
dividend in the bargain element of a sale and leaseback between parent and subsidiary corporations, and
held that when neither corporation benefited from the arrangement, the transfer upstream was purely for
the benefit of the CEO and the 100% owner of the parent. The court also found that the parent's failure
to report capital gains on a portion of proceeds from the leveraged buyout of the subsidiary amounted to
tax fraud. See id. at 2357-58. In Marquis Products, Inc. v. Conquest Carpet Mills. Inc. (In re Marquis
Products, Inc.), 150 B.R. 487 (Bankr. D. Me. 1993), the court held that a subsidiary's guaranty of a loan
to the parent was a fraudulent conveyance because the thinly capitalized subsidiary had made itself
insolvent by transferring its assets upstream. Cf Carl, supra note 149, at 118 (describing an upstream
guaranty by a subsidiary).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
153. See, e.g., Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[D]irect operator liability for
parent corporations is both compatible with the statutory language and consistent with CERCLA's broad
remedial scheme."); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("[A]
corporation which holds stock in another corporation (e.g., a subsidiary) and actively participates in its
management can be held liable for cleanup costs incurred as a result of that corporation's disposal."). See
also PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION § 18 (1989); Peter S. Mcneil. Legal
Advising on Corporate Structure in the New Era of Environmental Liability, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
399, 410-11 ("(T]he unsettled nature of the law with regard to the liability of parent corporations for the
environmental harms of their subsidiaries ... suggests that risk-insulating approaches to minimizing
environmental liabilities cannot provide the guarantees that they once offered."); Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy
A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 259
(1992).
154. 68 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1995).
155. Id. at 1091-92.
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only from acts of a particular party, but also from acts of any related
party.t56
C. Fraudulent Conveyance Law
The dividend that a judgment-proofing subsidiary might pay to its
shareholder is only one form of payment that might be subject to fraudulent
conveyance law. Distributions to the parent's own shareholders might also be
suspect. Of course, fraudulent conveyance laws will not restrict the granting
of secured credit or asset securitization. As Professor LoPucki notes, any asset-
securitization sale for "reasonable equivalent value" will not be voidable under
section 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 57 As noted above, '
however, to the extent that an asset securitization sale or any other transfer of
corporate assets is for reasonably equivalent value, the corporation has not
succeeded in hiding any assets: It still has the proceeds of the sale as assets.
To conclude that the vagueness of the rules on fraudulent conveyance
renders them inconsequential would be a mistake. For example, the fraudulent
conveyance laws were used successfully against shareholders and lenders in
156. See. e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-178 (1997) (making a lando ner and a person cauing air
pollution jointly and severally liable). FLA. STAT. ANsN. § 403 141 (\Vest Supp 1996) (proiding joint and
several liability for air and water pollution): MitC STAT ANN § 324 20126 to 324 20126u ILa% Co-op
1996) (providing joint and several liability for personal injury arising from release of hazardous subtance,.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.94DD (1996) (providing joint and se,.eral habilitt for ensironniental damage
arising from offshore oil and gas activities): TE'*N CODE- AsN § 68-212-107(2)(41 (1996) (authorizing joint
and several liability for persons involved in the handling of haizardous ,.aste) See i:reerals Ptt i I
BLUMBERG & KURT A. STRASSER. LAW OF CORPORATE GROL Ps- PROBLEIMS OF PAREN'T" ANt) SL BSIDI \R'N
CORPORATIONS UNDER STATE STATUrTORY LAW (1995)
A purchaser of corporate assets may be liable as a successor if the purchase is a dc facto merger. if
there is continuity with the purchased corporation, or if the transaction Is a fraudulent transaction structured
to evade liability. See B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski. 99 F.3d 505. 519 (2d Cir 1996) (ppl,,Ing success.or
liability in a CERCLA case because otherwise "a predecessor could benelit from the illegal dipoal ot
hazardous substances and later evade responsibility for remediation sitmply by changing the lort in %%.hich
it does business"); Chicago Truck Drivers Union Pension Fund s Tasemkin. Inc. 59 1; 3d 48 lith Cir
1995) (holding that a pension fund that could not recoser from a debtor in bankruptc may recoer from
the successor corporation): United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co. 980 F2d 478. 487 t8th Cir 199)
(holding that "[because corporate successors are within CERCLA's atnibit of liability. CERCLA inust also
incorporate the traditional doctnnes developed to prevent corporate successors friom adroitl) clpping otf
the hook"); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chem. Inc. 757 F2d 1256. 1264-65 tFed Cir 1985)
(holding a defendant corporation liable as a successor when it had been created from all the .tsctN and
personnel of a patent-infnnging corporation)- Gould. Inc % A & M Battery & Tire Set, . 950 F Supp 653
(M.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that the purchaser of a corporation's assets was a 5uccessor on a continuity -of-
enterprise theory of successor liability and was liable under CERCLA). Schmoll . Acand,. Inc . 703 F
Supp. 868, 874 (D. Or. 1988) (holding the successor corporation liable because there %%as "no just reason
to respect the integrity" of the transactions in a corporate group reorganization that v, %s "designed a  ith the
improper purpose of escaping asbestos-related liabilities") See generall PittJ.iP I BL %I BIt-R(;, L.  o-
CORPORATE GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE LAW § 13.05 (1987) (dealing .%th implications of succesor
corporation liability for the imposition of intergroup tor liability)
157. See LoPucki, supra note I, at 27 (citing U"iF. FRAL DL LENT TRANSFtR COt.E § 4A. 7A U L A
652 (1985) (stating that if there exists no actual intent to defraud, receipt of "reasonably cquisalent saluc"
bars a fraudulent conveyance claim)).
158. See supra note 49.
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several of the leveraged buyouts of the 1980s.159  Threat of their use
doubtless forestalled or required changes in other leveraged buyouts during that
time. Moreover, these rules have been applied in many cases against debtors
who have attempted to avoid their liability by buying Florida homesteads and
the like.'60 Although most of these cases involve individual debtors, the
principles articulated in them threaten any analogous conveyance of corporate
assets.
In addition, fraudulent conveyance laws' vagueness may give them a larger
prophylactic effect upon firms that would otherwise distribute their assets than
would clear and certain laws. Philip Morris and RJR Nabisco, both facing
monumental potential liabilities for smoking-related illnesses, have not spun
off their food subsidiaries. 16' Whether fraudulent conveyance law would
prohibit those spinoffs is debatable, but I doubt that many lawyers would give
an unequivocal opinion that the distribution of a tobacco company's food
assets to shareholders is not a fraudulent conveyance. 162 Given such
159. See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986); Moody v.
Pacific Credit Inc., 127 B.R. 958 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); In re O'Day Corp., 126 B.R. 370 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1991); Weibolt Stores v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1988).
160. See, e.g., Salomon v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser), 722 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding an attempted
purchase of a Florida homestead fraudulent under bankruptcy law); United States v. Werner, 857 F. Supp.
286 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding assets secreted in a Liechtenstein trust reachable by a federal income tax
lien); Kapila v. Coevino (In re Coevino), 187 B.R. 773 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (judging an attempt to
remove assets from the reach of creditors by investing them in a Florida annuity to be a fraudulent
conveyance and deeming an attempt to do so by paying off a Florida mortgage inequitable); In re Coplan,
156 B.R. 88 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding a Florida homestead exemption invalid where the debtors
moved to Florida and bought a homestead on the eve of bankruptcy); In re Butcher, 62 B.R. 162 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1986) (denying an attempt to assert the Florida homestead exemption in bankruptcy).
161. As Professor LoPucki points out, some minor players in the tobacco industry had spun off their
assets even before he wrote. For example, Kimberly Clark spun off its cigarette paper manufacturing
business. See LoPucki, supra note I, at 65 n.275. On October 15, 1997, B.A.T. Industries, PLC, announced
its intention to distribute its tobacco business to its shareholders and to merge the remainder of its business
with Zurich Insurance Company. See Suein L. Hwang & Milo Geyelin, B.A.T May Kick Tobacco Habit,
Despite Some Legal Insulation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1997, at B8. A quote in a contemporaneous article
from one of B.A.T.'s New York lawyers suggests that B.A.T. had asked its lawyers about the legal
consequences of this distribution. See id. Of course, the tobacco divisions of B.A.T., R. J. Reynolds, or
Philip Morris are so richly endowed with assets that they would not be regarded as judgment proof by any
standard measure. See id.
162. The corporate fraudulent conveyance analogues are state corporate law restrictions on the payment
of dividends. For example, title 8, section 170 of the Delaware Code states that directors may declare
dividends
either (I) out of its surplus, as defined in and computed in accordance with §§ 154 and 244 of
this title, or (2) in case there shall be no such surplus, out of its net profits for the fiscal year
in which the dividend is declared and/or the preceding fiscal year. If the capital of the
corporation, computed in accordance with §§ 154 and 244 of this title, shall have been
diminished by depreciation in the value of its property, or by losses, or otherwise, to an amount
less than the aggregate amount of the capital represented by the issued and outstanding stock
of all classes having a preference upon the distribution of assets, the directors of such
corporation shall not declare and pay out of such net profits any dividends upon any shares of
any classes of its capital stock until the deficiency in the amount of capital represented by the
issued and outstanding stock of all classes having a preference upon the distribution of assets
shall have been repaired.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1996); see also Wittenberg v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co., 133 A. 48
(Del. Ch. 1926) (holding that corporations cannot declare dividends except out of profits and that the
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uncertainty, firms will see judgment proofing not as an ace under the table but
as a dangerous wildcard.
D. Bargains by Prospective Creditors and Joint Tortfeasors
When a patient dies in surgery and the plaintiff's heirs or estate sues for
wrongful death, the surgeon will rarely be the only defendant; at a minimum,
the plaintiff is likely to name the anesthesiologist and the hospital. The
peripheral joint tortfeasors are unlikely to be as guilty of malpractice
committed in the operating room as the surgeon, but if the surgeon has no
assets, the peripheral parties will be targets. Such joint tortfeasors understand
their vulnerability, and they are likely to insist that every potential joint
tortfeasor have insurance or sufficient assets to meet his or her
responsibility. 1
63
Not only will potential joint tortfeasors object to being pushed into the
front ranks when the plaintiffs start shooting, but they also will be concerned
for their own claims for contribution against other joint tortfeasors. The
physician's judgment proofing protects him not only from the plaintiff in the
original suit, but also from recovery by the joint tortfeasors' insurers of a pro
rata share of the judgment. For these reasons, one would expect hospitals,
physicians, and their insurers to require that all persons have insurance or to
provide that an umbrella organization, such as the hospital or Health
Management Organization (HMO), buy insurance that covers all.'t
This response by potential joint tortfeasors is not limited to the medical
malpractice field. Some auditors now refuse to audit certain companies for fear
that the auditors themselves will be exposed to liability if those companies
fail.165 Presumably the same is true in other circumstances in which
experience shows that a particular kind of tort is likely to arise from the
invested capital shall be kept intact), aff'd. 138 A. 347 (Del. 1927)
163. Or they will be sure that they themselves have sufficient liability insurance to cover potential tort
claims. See Mary Ellen P. Dooley, An Inphed Right of Contribution Under Rule 106-5 An ts.senttal
Element of Attaining the Goals ofthe Securities Etchange Act of 1934. 61 FORDHIA'm. L Ri:v 185 (1993)
(making this point in the context of secured transactions).
164. This is all the more so because hospitals are subject to vicartous liability for the malpractce of
doctors using their facilities-even if those doctors are in fact independent contractors, See Kenneth S
Abraham & Paul C. Veiler, Enterprise Medical Ltabilth and tie Evolution of the Anier an health Care
System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 388 (1994): see also id. at 381 (arguing that "making hospitals liable for
all malpractice by their affiliated physicians, would better serve the goals of tort la, than does, the current
individual liability regime"). In fact, most hospitals require their doctors to carry malpractice insurance See
William M. Sage et al.. Enterprise LiabtliY for Medical Malpractice and Health Carr Quali% Improvement.
20 AM. J.L. & MED. I, 24 n.133 (1994). While there is no requirement of malpractice insurance in the
HMO Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e (Vest Supp. 1997). many HMOs also require insurance. see. eg. Sage ct
al., supra, at 17. Diana Joseph Bearden and Bryan J. Maedgen urge HMOs to require medical malpractice
insurance of their doctors. See Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen. Enterging Theores of Liabihrl
in the Managed Health Care htdustr', 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 285. 356 (1995).
165. See Elizabeth MacDonald, More Accounting Firms Are Dumping Risk" Clients. WAt. ST J , Apr
25, 1997, at A2.
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participation of several firms. 66 For example, one would expect an airplane
manufacturer and the manufacturer of engines for that airplane to bargain over
such issues. In this context, as in the medical malpractice context, each actor
sees itself as a potential joint tortfeasor and, if it is insured or has sufficient
assets, as a potential creditor of the other joint tortfeasors. These prospective
joint tortfeasors are a proxy for our victim, the tort creditor. Speaking for
themselves, they will demand assets or insurance that will indirectly benefit
any tort victim.
E. Bargains by Potential Judgment Creditors
For the most part, tort and similar claimants are unknown before the
tortious act and, by hypothesis, they cannot protect themselves by bargaining
with the tortfeasor. But in a few cases prospective judgment creditors have
agents who, at least in gross, foresee their claims. Routinely, unions bargain
for pension, health, and life insurance benefits that will pay, if at all, in the
distant future. To a limited extent, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), as the ultimate insurer of pension liability, acts as a proxy for
prospective claimants. 67 Both unions and the PBGC will scrutinize the
solvency of the potential debtor and ask that funds be set aside for other
agreements made to provide pensions and other benefits. Like the joint
tortfeasor, these agents act as proxies for future creditors.
F. Loss of Assets
Some of the most traditional and ancient judgment-proofing activities have
inherent risks that minimize their effectiveness. 168 An individual's classic
mode of judgment proofing himself is to convey property to a spouse or child.
This transaction is likely to be a fraudulent conveyance, but with luck one
might escape a fraudulent conveyance claim. Yet there is no evidence that
physicians and wealthy sole proprietors are conveying their property to their
spouses at any greater rate than in the past. Why? I suspect that there is a
natural limit on these transactions: The transferor fears that the transferee will
166. "With joint and several liability, firms must also consider the potential liability they may face
for other joint tortfeasors who become insolvent." Note, "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of
Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1778 (1996).
167. The creation of the PBGC is mandated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) §§ 4001-4068, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1368 (1994). The PBGC guaranties vested benefits, see 29
U.S.C. § 1322, and has the power to terminate financially troubled plans, see 29 U.S.C. § 1341. In both
of these capacities, the PBGC provides potential aid to prospective tort claimants.
168. See, e.g., Karen Blumenthal, Simmons, Daughters Facing Court Battle, WALL ST. J., May 16,
1997, at BII (reporting on the difficulties that can arise from secreting one's assets in trusts with one's
children as the beneficiaries).
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not keep the explicit or implicit promise to retransfer the assets or to allow the
transferor to enjoy them.
Any time a potential debtor puts its assets beyond the reach of creditors
with the expectation of continuing to enjoy them or of later getting them back,
there is the persistent threat that the transferee will prove unfaithful or
incapable. For most, I suspect that the discounted annual cost of that brooding
threat exceeds the cost of malpractice insurance premiums or of other
alternatives.
G. Requirements Set by Law
A direct barrier to judgment proofing is legislation,' such as workers'
compensation laws that require the purchase of insurance or the maintenance
of proven net worth. Annually, thousands of U.S. workers are killed on the
job, and tens of thousands are injured.' 0 Most of these losses are covered
by workers' compensation insurance, which every state legally mandates.'7 '
Measured by the number of potential claims, workers' compensation may be
the single largest barrier to judgment proofing." -
In addition to workers' compensation, many states require persons engaged
in certain enterprises to carry liability insurance. For example, New York City
regulations require taxicabs to carry at least $150,000 of liability insurance;
moreover, the medallions that are required to operate taxicabs in New York
City, which are worth about $200,000 each. cannot be renewed if there is an
outstanding claim against the cabs that operate under them."' Similar
regulations in Chicago require taxicabs to carry $350,000 of liability
insurance. 74
169. Examples of federal laws that provide for habiltn, claims and car'2 insurance. financial
responsibility, or other requirements inconsistent , th judgment proofing are the Coiprehcntsi.
Environmental Response, Compensation. and Liabilit, Act (CERCLA). %khich prosides that propcrt,
involved in a release of hazardous substances is subject to a federal hen in an amount equal to the costs
of removal or remedial action. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l) (1994). and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 'hich
requires -evidence of financial responsibility sufficient to meet the maximum amount of liabilit, to sshich
the responsible party could be subjected." 33 U.S.C. § 2716(a) (19941
170. See William Serrin, Tire Wages of Wbrt. NATIO.. Jan 28. 1991. at 80
171. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. 1995 AALYSTS OF WORKERS" COMPLS,%IO% L.%%%s 3
(1995).
172. In 1991, workers' compensation accounted for 14 9'- of total loss compensation and %.A second
only to health insurance as a compensatory mechanism. See HEstaR IT AL.. sapra note 16. it 108
173. Telephone Interview with Vincent Andreass. Assistant Gen Counsel. Nest York Ct, Taxi and
Limousine Comm'n (Oct. I, 1996). New York State requires hiabilit. insurance of S25.000 for one peron.
and S50,000 for more than one. This would be available. for example, to coser pin and suffering In
addition, the city requires cabs to carry S100,000 in no-fault liability insurance that would cover medical
expenses and lost wages. Finally. up to S400.000 would be a%ailable to tort claimants from the salue of
the medallions. Of course, medallions may well be subject to a security interest and. if so. a smaller portion
of the value would be available. Id.
174. Telephone Interview with Paula Becker. Deputy Comm'r. Chicago Public Vehicles Dcp't (July
3, 1997). Some states do, however, require less insurance. in Baker & Drake. Inc v Publi Service
Commission (In re Baker & Drake. Inc.). 35 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir 1994). for example, a cab company had
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Certain other businesses that deal with the public are required in most
states to carry insurance covering their liability to the public or are required
to prove their financial capacity to meet this liability.175 In effect, these laws
act directly on behalf of potential creditors (the injured workers in workers'
compensation cases, and the injured members of the public, in other cases)
who themselves become "involuntary creditors." They are a self-conscious bar
to judgment proofing.
to declare bankruptcy due to personal injury lawsuits; in reorganization, the company tried to make its
drivers independent contractors, but this was found to be a statutory violation. Cf. Teamsters Local No. 310
v. Ingrum (In re Tucson Yellow Cab Co.), 789 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 1986) (reporting that $100,000 of
mandated insurance coverage was not enough to cover a personal injury law suit brought against the cab
company, which declared bankruptcy).
175. Most states require pest control professionals to carry liability insurance or, in some cases, other
proof of financial responsibility. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 8691-8692 (\vest 1995); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 35-10-106 (1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1208 (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 487.046
(Harrison 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-7-103 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460J-3 (Michie 1995); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 206.13 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-2448 (1991); MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 5-207
(Supp. 1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 132B, § 10 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997). Several states require health
care providers to carry liability insurance or other proof of financial responsibility. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-32-102 (1996) (podiatrists); id. § 12-40-126 (optometrists); id. § 13-64-301 (1997) (every
physician, dentist, or health care institution); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-1 lb (1997) (physicians); id. § 20-18b
(osteopaths); id. § 20-28b (chiropractors); id. § 20-39a (natureopaths); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3402 (1996)
(health care providers); id. § 65-2005 (1992) (podiatrists); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 625.508 (1996)
(chiropractors); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 448.075 (West Supp. 1997) (podiatrists). Many states require private
investigators and security guard or bodyguard services to carry liability insurance or other proof of financial
responsibility. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2613 (West 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-40-308
(Michie 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-38-6 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7b 1 (1989); MD. CODE ANN.,
BUs. Occ. & PROF. §§ 13-604, 19-504 (Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74C-10 (1989). Several states
require the following businesses to carry liability insurance or other proof of financial responsibility: fire
sprinkler or alarm installers, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 198B.595 (1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
37:2156.2, 37:2167 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74D-9 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-
45-70, 40-79-80 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); asbestos removal contractors, see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-
27-1006 (Michie Supp. 1993); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-3a (West 1998); handlers or owners
of dangerous animals, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4 (1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 459-503-A (West
1995); R.I. GEN. LAws § 4-13.1-3 (1987); electricians, plumbers, or contractors, see, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 444-11.1 (Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2167 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN.,
BUS. OcC. & PROF. § 12-501 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 8-302 (1996); MINN. STAT. § 326.40
(1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-07-04 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-16-20 (Michie 1997); gasoline
dealers, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 234.120 (1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1847 (West 1997); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 39-43-60 (Law Co-op. 1996); foster homes, day-care centers, or nursery schools, see. e.g.,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1597.531 (West 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 8402 (\Vest
1996); TEX. HuM. REs. CODE ANN. § 42.049 (West 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.627 (\Vest 1997); motor
carriers, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-1, 128 (1996); id. § 281.655; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 221.035 (West
1992); carnivals and circuses, see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 181 (\Vest 1991); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 33-6-101 (Michie 1996); guides, outfitters, or commercial whitewater rafting companies, see, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-32-105 (1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 7365 (West 1996); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 23-2-413 (Michie 1996). This list is not nearly exhaustive; insurance requirements in some states
are highly particularized and sometimes surprising. For example, Michigan has an insurance requirement
for electric sign specialists, see MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.204(3j) (Law Co-op. 1996); Oklahoma requires
alternative fuels technicians to carry liability insurance. see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 130.16 (Vest
1995); New Jersey requires acupuncture researchers to carry liability insurance, see N.J. STxr. ANN. §
45:9B-8 (West 1991); Texas requires liability insurance of testers and inspectors of ranch scales, see TEX.
AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 13.353 (West 1995); New York requires appearance enhancement professionals such
as hair stylists to carry liability insurance, see N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 405 (McKinney 1996); and Maryland
requires liability insurance of organizers of beach bingo games, see MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES &




Even when the legislature does not require insurance or prohibit transfers,
the potential for government action may have an effect upon the behavior of
firms that would otherwise judgment proof themselves. For example, large and
prominent companies such as Exxon, General Electric, General Motors, and all
of the other Fortune 500 companies repeatedly petition federal, state, and local
governments for permits, licenses, authorizations, and the like. Some of the
most prominent, such as General Electric and Boeing, have large contracts with
agencies of the federal government and even turn to the federal government for
help in international sales competitions or, in the case of the oil companies,
against foreign regimes that threaten to nationalize their assets. For a company,
like Boeing, that is dependent on government contracts, failure to pay a claim
against a subsidiary could result in a federal determination that the company
is not financially responsible or even in its debarment from government
contract work. Either would be catastrophic.
To the extent that companies judgment proof themselves and, having done
so, fail to pay what are perceived to be just tort liabilities, they would not only
disqualify themselves from other government contracts, but would also anger
the political friends on whom they rely for friendly discretion. Consider the
political reaction that might have followed from Exxon's assertion of limited
liability arising from the fact that the Exxon Valdez was owned by a
subsidiary or from a comparable attempt by Manville or Robins to escape their
tort liability. A firm that becomes a public pariah by judgment proofing
increases costs and risks the impairment of rights and favors from federal,
state, and local government.
I. Consumer Reaction
Regulation among consumers is similarly important for companies that sell
to the public under their corporate names. Companies like Exxon, Johnson &
Johnson, General Motors, and General Electric spend millions of dollars
developing and maintaining images as responsible, reliable companies that
produce safe and efficacious products. 76 For Johnson & Johnson to deny
liability when there is a Tylenol scare or for Exxon to deny liability for an oil
176. American companies with public image programs spent. on aerage. more than $1 5 million each
on these programs in 1980. See Thomas F. Garbeit. When To Advertise Your Comnpan. HAW., Bt s REV.
Mar.-Apr. 1982. at 100, 101. Professor LoPucki apparently contemplates the possibility thai all compamen.
will avoid an adverse consumer reaction by simultaneously becoming judgment proof hand in hand Given
our antitrust law and the culture of sharp competition among %anous American companies. I see little
reason to assume that General Motors would join vtth General Electric. much less '.uth Chr)sler to
undertake an act that would be widely criticized in the press. by the courts, and probably by elected
officials as well.
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spill would undermine their status with the public and would forfeit the
millions of dollars that they have spent to burnish their names.
IV. CONCLUSION
The specter of widespread judgment proofing by commercial firms is mere
fantasy. The data from the Compustat database show that public companies
grant much more modest levels of security than would be necessary to render
themselves judgment proof. The same data show that most companies have
free assets that greatly exceed their liabilities and that their asset-to-liability
ratios have changed only modestly over the last fifteen years. The data also
show that these public companies carry substantial amounts of liability
insurance-apparently the same or greater insurance coverage than fifteen
years ago. While these data do not disprove the possibility of judgment
proofing by an occasional company, they refute the proposition that judgment
proofing is widespread among American commercial firms.
The many barriers to judgment proofing discussed in Part III suggest that
the absence of judgment proofing is unlikely to change. Among the barriers is
the resistance of contract creditors, which redounds not only to their benefit
but also to the benefit of involuntary creditors such as tort claimants. Many
laws, such as workers' compensation laws, stand directly in the way, and a
close examination of a subsidiary's legal and economic relation to its parent
shows that this theoretical avenue to judgment proofing is difficult and
abstract.
Although my data are taken exclusively from public companies, I believe
that data from private companies would be no different.177 Almost all of the
barriers in Part III to judgment proofing apply equally to public and private
firms. And even if the judgment-proofing devices identified by Professor
LoPucki were used more frequently by private than by public firms, their use
would present a substantially smaller social problem, for a company's liability-
producing capacity is proportional to its size. In addition, contract creditors and
other guardians of corporate solvency may be even more watchful of private
than of public companies.
In summary, corporate judgment proofing is not a significant social
problem today, and it is unlikely to become one. Liability lives.
177. For data showing that the smallest businesses do not use secured credit to judgment proof
themselves, see Mann, Small-Business Lending, supra note 132, at 24.
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